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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is unique among
the thirteen United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. An Article III
federal appellate court, the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 by a
merger of the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
appellate division of the U.S. Court of Claims.' As a result of this
merger, the Federal Circuit retained the jurisdiction formerly vested
1. See generally Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR.,
http://ww.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/courtjuisdiction.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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in those courts2 and also gained exclusive, nationwide jurisdiction to
hear appeals of final and interlocutory decisions arising out of
specific types of cases.' The Federal Circuit may hear matters
concerning, inter alia, interlocutory and final decisions involving
"international trade, government contracts, patents, certain money
claims against the United States government, federal personnel,
veterans' benefits, and public safety officers' benefits claims. '
With respect to international trade cases, the Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction for appeals of the interlocutory5 and final
decisions6 of the U.S. Court of International Trade (the "Trade
Court"), which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear civil actions
involving import transactions and international trade,7 including
those arising under the Tariff Act of 1930.' The Federal Circuit also
has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of the interlocutory9 and final
determinations0  of the U.S. International Trade Commission
(USITC or the "Commission"), which, under and pursuant to the
Tariff Act, investigates import injury matters (e.g., antidumping and
countervailing duties)" and other matters pertaining to unfair
import trade practices.2
2. John R. Magnus & Sheridan S. McKinney, 2012 International Trade Law
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 62 AM. U. L. REv. 963, 964 (2013).
3. Court Jurisdiction, supra note 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012) (enumerating
the scope of the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction, which includes
jurisdiction over appeals from the U.S. Court of International Trade (the "Trade
Court") and final decisions of the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC
or "the Commission")).
4. Court Jurisdiction, supra note 1; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(c)-(d), 1295
(delineating the scope of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (1).
6. Id. § 1295(a) (5).
7. About the Court, U.S. Ci. IN''L TRADE, http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/
AboutTheCourt.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1585 (setting
forth the Trade Court's jurisdiction).
8. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (1).
10. Id. § 1295(a) (6).
11. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1336(a), 1671a(b), 1673a(b); see Import Injury, U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMMISSION, http://www.usitc.gov/trade-remedy.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)
(providing an overview of the USITC and Department of Commerce's roles in
antidumping ("AD") and countervailing duty ("CVD") investigations).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)-(b); see Intellectual Property Infringement and Other Unfair
Acts, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.usitc.gov/intellectualproperty.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (discussing the USITC's authority to conduct intellectual
property infringement investigations concerning imported goods).
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In 2014, the Federal Circuit issued thirty-six precedential opinions
in the international trade-related cases it heard on appeal from the
Trade Court and USITC."3 Of those cases, the Federal Circuit
affirmed twenty-seven cases, reversed or vacated seven cases, and
issued two orders it considered of precedential value.4
Fifteen of the Federal Circuit's opinions primarily involved customs
duties and tariff assessment questions under the Tariff Act, with
twelve of the tariff assessment cases specifically addressing the
classification of imported goods under and pursuant to the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (the "HTSUS" or
"HTS"). 5 One of the tariff assessment cases, Deckers Corp. v. United
States,'6 is of special note because it provided the Federal Circuit with
a rare opportunity to discuss the Federal Circuit's unique stare decisis
jurisprudence in the context of an HTSUS tariff classification case.'7
Of the remaining three customs duties cases, one addressed the
fraudulent understatement of dutiable value,8 one addressed the
assessment of customs duties in general,9 and one involved
liquidation of the assessed customs duty.20
13. Please see the Appendix to this Article for a complete listing, in table format,
of the precedential international trade opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in
2014. The table provides the names and citations of the opinions, identifies the
type of case and the relevant U.S. agency, and provides the Federal Circuit's
disposition of the case.
14. See infra Parts II.C, III.C., IV.B (reviewing selected customs duty and tariff
assessment cases, anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases, and section 337 cases).
In this Article, those opinions involving the same or similar issues
15. See infra Part II.C (describing the customs duty and tariff assessment cases
that the Federal Circuit reviewed in 2014). The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States (the "HTSUS" or "HTS") is located at 19 U.S.C. § 1202. The HTSUS is
no longer published in the U.S. Code but is maintained by the USITC. See About
Harmonized Tariff Schedule, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.usitc.gov/
tariff.affairs/about.hts.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (providing an overview of the
HTSUS). See generally infra note 85 (explaining the HTSUS standard of review).
16. 752 F.3d 949 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
17. Id. at 954-66 (noting that in tariff classification cases, the panels are bound by
prior decisions unless relieved by an en banc order or a U.S. Supreme Court decision).
18. United States v. Trek Leather, Inc., 767 F.3d 1288, 1291, 1300 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (affirming the Court of International Trade's conclusion that an import
company president understated dutiable value of imported men's suits), petition for
cert. docketed sub. nom Shadadpuri v. United States (U.S. Feb. 13, 2015) (No. 14-986).
19. United States v. C.H. Robinson Co., 760 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding a bonded carrier was liable for duties, taxes, and fees for missing
imported merchandise).
20. Chemsol, LLC v. United States, 755 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(affirming the Court of International Trade's decision that it did not have
[Vol. 64:899
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In addition, seventeen Federal Circuit cases addressed
antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders and related matters
under the Tariff Act,21 one of which is of special note-Guangdong
Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co. v. United States.22 In Guangdong
Wireking, the Federal Circuit addressed an Ex Post Facto Clause
challenge to a Tariff Act amendment that increased the scope and
amount of antidumping duty/countervailing duty (AD/CVD) rates to
be imposed upon certain items imported from the People's Republic
of China.23 Guangdong Wireking is discussed in Part III.
In addition to Guangdong Wireking, the Federal Circuit reviewed six
other AD/CVD cases challenging the methods used by the U.S.
Department of Commerce (Commerce) to calculate AD/CVD rates.24
Another four cases addressed challenges to Commerce's use21 of
adverse inferences against importers (or their governments) for
failing to cooperate with AD/CVD investigations.26 Three cases
involved calculation of AD rates to be imposed in light of
administrative reviews of existing AD orders.27 Of the remaining
three cases, one case addressed an importer's challenge to the
scope of an existing AD/CVD order,2" one case considered a
jurisdiction to review a challenge of the liquidation of entries where the
administrative process was adequate to remedy the claims).
21. See infra Part III.C (describing the AD and CVD order cases that the Federal
Circuit reviewed in 2014). The "AD" provisions of the Tariff Act are found at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673h (2012), and the "CVD" provisions are found at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-1671h.
22. 745 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
23. Id. at 1196.
24. Thai Plastic Bags Indus. Co. v. United States, 774 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Home Meridian Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Qingdao Sea-Line
Trading Co. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014); MacLean-Fogg Co. v.
United States, 753 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Marvin Furniture (Shanghai) Co. v.
United States, 744 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
25. Under the Tariff Act, both the USITC and the Department of Commerce
(Commerce) play a role in determining whether antidumping duties and/or
countervailing duties should be assessed. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671-1671h (countervailing
duties); § 1673-1673h (antidumping duties).
26. Mukand, Ltd. v. United States, 767 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Peer Bearing
Co.-Changshan v. United States, 766 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Essar Steel, Ltd. v.
United States, 753 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Ltd. v.
United States, 748 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
27. Lifestyle Enter., Inc. v. United States, 751 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Mueller
Comercial de Mex., S. de R.L. de C.V. v. U.S., 753 F.3d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Thai
Plastic Bags Indus. Co. v. United States, 746 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
28. Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States, 755 F.3d 912 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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challenge to the instructions issued by Commerce with respect to an
existing AD/CVD order,29 and one case involved challenges to
USITC's and Commerce's determinations that certain imports
would not harm the relevant industry."
Finally, the Federal Circuit issued four precedential decisions in
cases involving international patent infringement cases reviewed by
the USITC, or "section 337" cases.3' Of these, two addressed
enforcement of consent orders preventing the import of infringing
products,3 2 one addressed whether an imported product violated a
U.S. inventor's patent,33 and one considered whether, in an
infringement case, a writ of mandamus should issue to compel the
USITC to review a party's non-infringement argument.4
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes the Trade
Court's jurisdiction and briefly discusses the two main categories of
international trade-related cases heard by it: (1) customs duties and
tariff assessments under the Tariff Act and (2) AD/CVD orders,
investigations, and other matters under the Tariff Act. Part II
discusses the customs matters appealed to the Federal Circuit from
the Trade Court, and includes a description of the relevant statutory
basis and procedural history permitting the Trade Court and Federal
Circuit to exercise jurisdiction in those matters. Similarly, Part III
addresses the AD/CVD matters heard by the Trade Court and
appealed to the Federal Circuit, together with the relevant statutory
and procedural bases supporting the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Trade Court and Federal Circuit in those cases. Part rV addresses the
section 337 cases heard by the Federal Circuit, including the relevant
statutory basis and procedural history of those cases.
29. Michaels Stores, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
30. Wind Tower Trade Coal. v. United States, 741 F.3d 89 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
31. See infra Part 1V.B (reviewing the four precedential decisions). See generally 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (establishing the requirements for "section 337" cases, or international
parent infringement cases involving unfair practices in import trade).
32. UPI Semiconductor Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 767 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Align Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 771 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
33. X2YAttenuators, LLCv. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 757 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
34. In re Nokia Inc., 760 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
[Vol. 64:899904
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
A. The U.S. Court of International Trade
The U.S. Court of International Trade is an Article III court
created by the Customs Control Act of 1980 (Customs Courts Act). 5
The result of a comprehensive overhaul of the federal judiciary with
respect to international trade-related litigation, the Customs Courts
Act clarified and expanded the jurisdiction of the U.S. Customs
Court and reconstituted it as the U.S. Court of International Trade
(the "Trade Court")." Headquartered in New York City, the Trade
Court hears cases that arise throughout the United States and has the
authority to hold hearings in foreign countries.
37
As set forth in the Customs Courts Act, the Trade Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over international trade-related civil actions,
3 8
including certain matters brought by the United States3 9-together
with any related counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims-
that arise under or concern the application of the Tariff Act with
respect to merchandise imported into the United States.4" The Trade
Court hears two main categories of cases under the Tariff Act:
customs matters and AD/CVD matters.41
Generally, the customs matters the Trade Court hears involve
challenges concerning the customs duties U.S. Customs and Border
Protection ("CBP") assesses against merchandise entering into the
United States under the Tariff Act.42 These challenges primarily
include (1) judicial review of protests brought by importers against
CBP concerning the amounts of customs duties imposed on
35. Pub. No. L. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
36. Id. § 102, 94 Stat. 1727. The U.S. Customs Court became an Article III court
in 1956; prior to that, it was an Article I court that replaced the Board of General
Appraisers, a quasi-judicial agency formed in 1890 within the U.S. Department of the
Treasury. About the Court, supra note 7.
37. About the Court, supra note 7.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1581.
39. See id. § 1582 (pertaining to actions generally brought by the United States);
id. § 1584 (concerning actions brought by the United States under the North
American Free Trade Agreement or the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement).
40. Id. § 1583.
41. Id. § 1581 (a)-(c) (providing that the Trade Court has "exclusive jurisdiction"
over customs and AD/CVD matters).
42. See, generally, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514- 1516A.
2015] 905
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merchandise imported into the United States,43 and (2) petitions by
interested parties in the United States" regarding customs duties
CBP imposed on imported merchandise.45 Similarly, the AD/CVD
cases the Trade Court hears primarily involve actions for judicial
review of the AD- and CVD-related proceedings of the USITC and
Commerce,46 including (1) investigations regarding allegations of
AD/CVD activities,47 (2) determinations to impose AD/CVD duties
following the investigations (including decisions to terminate an
investigation) ,48 and (3) the amounts to be imposed under any
AD/CVD orders.49
The Trade Court also has exclusive jurisdiction to hear any other
action against the United States pertaining to the administration,
imposition, and enforcement of the Tariff Actf ° However, the
Federal Circuit "has repeatedly held that [28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)] 'may
not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of § 1581
is or could have been available, unless the other remedy provided
under that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate."51
43. See id. § 1581(a) (stating that the Trade Court has "exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part,
under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930," which is now codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1515). Such protests are permitted by 19 U.S.C. § 1514. The amount and rate of
customs duties on goods imported into the United States by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) appear in the HTSUS. 19 U.S.C. § 1202.
44. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (outlining the petition process).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(b) (stating that the Trade Court has "exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under section 516 of the Tariff Act of
1930," which is now codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516).
46. See id. § 1581(c) (stating that the Trade Court has "exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930," which is
now codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a).
47. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671a (initiating a CVD investigation); id. § 1673a (initiating
an AD investigation).
48. See id. §§ 1671b-1671d (regarding CVD investigations); id. §§ 1673b-1673d
(regarding AD investigations).
49. See id. § 1671e (CVD); id. § 1673e (AD).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). This is the so-called "residual jurisdiction" provision
referenced in Chemsol, LLC v. United States, 755 F.3d 1345, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (calling the "residual jurisdiction" provision a "catch all provision" because it
grants the Trade Court broad jurisdiction to implement and enforce the Tariff Act
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
51. Chemsol, LLC, 755 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 688
F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
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B. The U.S. International Trade Commission
Initially created as the U.S. Tariff Commission under the Tariff Act
of 1930,52 the U.S. International Trade Commission (the
"Commission" or "USITC") "is an independent, quasi-judicial Federal
agency with broad investigative responsibilities on matters of trade.53
As set forth in the Tariff Act of 1930, the Commission is charged with
the duty
to investigate the administration and fiscal and industrial effects of
the customs laws of this country, the relations between the rates of
duty on raw materials and finished or partly finished products, the
effects of ad valorem and specific duties and of compound specific
and ad valorem duties, all questions relative to the arrangement of
schedules and classification of articles in the several schedules of
the customs law, and, in general, to investigate the operation of
customs laws, including their relation to the Federal revenues, their
effect upon the industries and labor of the country, and to submit
reports of its investigations as hereafter provided.4
As noted above, the Commission investigates both import injury
matters (e.g., AD- and CVD-related matters)55 and other matters
pertaining to unfair import trade practices, such as the importation
of items and merchandise that infringe upon any patent, trademark,
mask work, or copyright registered under the laws of the United
States.6 The intellectual property infringement investigations are
known as section 337 investigations and are conducted in accordance
with the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). As noted on the Commission's website,
52. Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 330, 46 Stat. 590, 696 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1330).
53. About the USITC, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/aboutusitc.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (a).
55. Id. §§ 1336(a), 1671a(b), 1673a(b) (setting forth the petition and
investigation procedures); Import Injury, supra note 11. The Commission's authority
to investigate AD-related matters arises under 19 U.S.C. § 1336(a), which provides, in
pertinent part, that the USITC shall "investigate the differences in the costs of
production of any domestic article and of any like or similar foreign article." 19
U.S.C. §1336(a). Further, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) grants the Commission
authority to investigate CVD-related matters. Id. § 1337(a) (1) (A).
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)-(E). However, these provisions only apply "if an
industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent,
copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned, exists or is in the process of
being established." Id. § 1337(a) (2).
57. Intellectual Property Infringement and Other Unfair Acts, supra note 12.
2015]
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Section 337 investigations conducted by the... Commission most
often involve claims regarding intellectual property rights,
including allegations of patent infringement and trademark
infringement by imported goods. Both utility and design patents,
as well as registered and common law trademarks, may be asserted
in these investigations. Other forms of unfair competition
involving imported products, such as infringement of registered
copyrights, mask works or boat hull designs, misappropriation of
trade secrets or trade dress, passing off, and false advertising, may
also be asserted .... The primary remedy available in Section 337
investigations is an exclusion order that directs Customs to stop
infringing imports from entering the United States. In addition,
the Commission may issue cease and desist orders against named
importers and other persons engaged in unfair acts that violate
Section 337. Expedited relief in the form of temporary exclusion
orders and temporary cease and desist orders may also be available
in certain exceptional circumstances."
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVIEW OF CUSTOMS DUTY AND TARIFF ASSESSMENT
A. Customs Duties and Tariff Assessments Under the Tariff Act
Under the Tariff Act, any merchandise arriving in the United
States by any vessel must be formally entered into the United States59
so that the merchandise may be examined, inspected, and
appraised.60 This process allows CBP to establish or estimate the
value of the merchandise,6" to classify the merchandise62 and
determine the duty rate to be assessed,63 and, ultimately, to
determine the amount of any duties, taxes, fines, or other fees to be
assessed against the merchandise.64  During this process, the
merchandise should remain in CBP's custody unless it is released
pursuant to a bond or other form of security.65 Once CBP has
completed the examination, classification, and appraisal process, CBP
58. Id.
59. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1484 (establishing requirements for entry of
merchandise into the United States, which involves providing documentation to CBP
so CBP may determine whether it can release the merchandise from its custody).
60. Id. § 1499(a).
61. Id. § 1500(a).
62. CBP classifies merchandise according to the HTSUS, which uses a
"hierarchical structure" to describe goods in trade and to set duty rates for those
goods. See About Harmonized Ta7ff Schedule, supra note 15.
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1500(b).
64. Id. § 1500(a)-(c).
65. Id. § 1499 (a).
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will "liquidate the entry."66  The liquidation calculation normally
includes the amounts to be paid under any AD or CVD orders, if any.67
In 1989, Congress enacted legislation creating the HTSUS, which
replaced the former Tariff Schedules of the United States.' As the
USITC has noted,
[t]he HTS comprises a hierarchical structure for describing all
goods in trade for duty, quota, and statistical purposes. This
structure is based upon the international Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS), administered by the World
Customs Organization in Brussels; the 4- and 6-digit HS product
categories are subdivided into 8-digit unique U.S. rate lines and 10-
digit non-legal statistical reporting categories. Classification of
goods in this system must be done in accordance with the General
and Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation, starting at the 4-digit
heading level to find the most specific provision and then moving
to the subordinate categories.... The USITC maintains and
publishes the HTS (in print and on-line) pursuant to the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988; see the preface to the HTS
for additional explanatory material. However, the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection of the Department of Homeland
Security is responsible for interpreting and enforcing the HTS.69
B. Judicial Review of Customs Duties and Tariff Assessments
Under the Tariff Act, all determinations made by CBP with respect
to customs duties to be imposed on merchandise imported into the
United States-including the value of the merchandise, the
classification and duty rate to be assessed, the total amount of the
duties to be paid, or any errors or omissions with respect to any of the
aboveV--are final and binding on all parties unless a party files a
protest with CBP or a civil action in the Trade Court.7 1 In addition,
interested parties located in the United States may file a petition with
66. Id. § 1500(d). The term "liquidation" means "the final computation or
ascertainment of duties on entries for consumption or drawback entries." 19
C.F.R. § 159.1 (2014). All entries of imported merchandise are to be liquidated.
Id. § 159.2.
67. See, e.g., U.S. Tsubaki, Inc. v. United States, 512 F.3d 1332, 1333-34 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (AD orders); Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1117 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (CVD orders).
68. About Harmonized Tariff Schedule, supra note 15.
69. Id.
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1)-(7).
71. Id. § 1514. Any such protest must be filed with CBP "within 180 days after but
not before. . . [the] date of liquidation or reliquidation, or ... the date of the
decision as to which protest is made." Id. § 1514(c) (3).
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CBP to challenge the description of the merchandise, the
classification and duty rate to be assessed, and the total amount of the
duty to be paid with respect to the entry of the merchandise.72
As previously mentioned, the Trade Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear challenges to the amount and rates of customs
duties CBP levies on merchandise that has been imported into the
United States.73 Hence, subject to the limitations imposed by the
Tariff Act, any party aggrieved by a decision of the CBP with respect
to a petition or protest challenging the customs duties to be assessed
against merchandise imported into the United States may file a civil
action in the Trade Court.v4 In turn, the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction to review appeals of interlocutory75 and final decisions of
the Trade Court, including the Trade Court's review of customs
duties petitions and protests.76
C. Customs Duty and Tariff Assessment Cases Reviewed by Federal
Circuit in 2014
In 2014, the Federal Circuit reviewed fifteen customs duties and
tariff assessment cases on appeal from the Trade Court. Of those
cases, twelve addressed, in one way or another, the classification of
merchandise under the HTSUS and, therefore, the applicable duty
rate to be used in calculating the duties to be assessed with respect to
the entry of those items. Eleven of these cases, including Deckers
(which discussed the Federal Circuit's unique stare decisis
jurisprudence), addressed specific issues that may arise respecting the
process for determining under what HTSUS heading an item should
be classified. The twelfth case addressed notice and due process
issues associated with a change in HTSUS classification that occurred
when CBP changed its interpretation of HTSUS headings without
following the relevant rulemaking and notice requirements.77
72. Id. § 1516.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (a) (stating that the Trade Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
review customs duties protests brought against CBP under 19 U.S.C. § 1515).
74. Id. § 1581(a)-(b). 28 U.S.C. § 2636 sets forth competing limitations§. For
example, it provides that actions to review a protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1515(a) must
be filed in Trade Court within 180 days after the notice of denial was mailed but that
actions under 19 U.S.C. § 1515(b) must be filed within 180 days after a protest denied by
operation of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2636(a).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1).
76. Id. § 1295(a)(5).
77. Int'l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (holding that CBP must follow the notice and comment procedures set forth
in 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) when it reclassifies certain imports).
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Of the remaining three cases, one addressed the imposition of
fines and penalties for items that went "missing" under a
Transportation and Exportation ("T&E") bond7" and another
addressed the fines and penalties imposed on an importer for
fraudulently understating or misrepresenting the dutiable value of
the items imported.79 The third case addressed CBP's extension of
the statutory liquidation period for entries of certain items as well as
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Trade Court under the residual
jurisdiction provision." However, because the Federal Circuit
specifically addressed the process of classifying merchandise under
the HTSUS in eleven of the thirty-six international trade-related
precedential decisions issued by it in 2014, this Part of the Article
solely focuses on those cases.8'
In its 2014 HTSUS-related decisions, the Federal Circuit took great
pains to explain and to reinforce the proper analytic framework to be
used in classifying items under the HTSUS. Of these decisions, the
opinions that best set forth the proper analytical framework for
classifying items under the HTSUS are Roche Vitamins, Inc. v. United
States2 and Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc. v. United States.3 The
remaining HTSUS classification cases-including Deckers, the stare
decisis case-each addressed a specific issue with respect to the
overall HTSUS classification analysis scheme.
In Roche Vitamins, Inc. and Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc., the
Federal Circuit provided a detailed outline of the specific process for
classifying items and applying a specific tariff provision under the
78. United States v. C.H. Robinson Co., 760 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As the
court explained, "[a] bonded carrier transporting merchandise pursuant to a T & E
entry must comply with certain regulations governing the receipt, safekeeping, and
disposition of bonded merchandise... [and] is responsible for any 'shortage,
irregular delivery, or nondelivery at the port of destination or exportation of bonded
merchandise received by it .. " Id. at 1380 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 18.8(a) (2014)). A
bonded carrier could also be liable for additional penalties related to bonded
merchandise that becomes missing, including fees, costs, expenses, unpaid duties,
and liquidated damages. Id.
79. United States v. Trek Leather, Inc., 767 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2014), petition
for crt. docketed sub. nom Shadadpuri v. United States (U.S. Feb. 13, 2015) (No. 14-986).
80. Chemsol, LLC v. United States, 755 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see
28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) (providing that the Trade Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
certain civil actions against the U.S.).
81. The Federal Circuit devoted nearly one-third of its 2014 international trade
decisions to the HTSUS classification process alone.
82. 772 F.3d 728 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
83. 757 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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HTSUS.84 The HTSUS classification and analysis process set forth by
the Federal Circuit consists of the following elements: (1) a
recitation of the applicable standard of review;5 (2) a description of
the HTSUS organization and classification scheme;6 (3) a reference
to the interpretive guidance provided in and mandated by the
HTSUS statute, namely the General Rules of Interpretation (the
"GRIs") and the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation (the
"ARIs"); 87 and (4) a reminder that the Explanatory Notes for each
HTSUS chapter, while not legally binding (they are published by the
World Customs Organization and are not part of the HTSUS statute),
are held in high esteem by the Federal Circuit and are "generally
indicative of the proper interpretation of a tariff provision."88
Several of the Federal Circuit's 2014 HTSUS Analysis opinions are
discussed below.
89
1. Roche Vitamins, Inc. v. United States
In Roche Vitamins, Inc., the Federal Circuit addressed the question
of the proper HTSUS classification of "BetaTab 20%" ("BetaTab"),
a product imported into the United States by Roche Vitamins, Inc.
84. Roche Vitamins, Inc., 772 F.3d at 730-31; Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc.,
757 F.3d at 1377-78.
85. According to the Federal Circuit, the HTSUS standard of review involves a
two-part analysis: (1) an interpretation of the provisions of the HTSUS, which are
questions of law and are reviewed de novo; and (2) a determination of whether an
item fits into a specific HTSUS category, which is a question of act and reviewed for
clear error. See Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1377 (citing Lemans
Corp. v. United States, 660 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); see also Roche Vitamins,
Inc., 772 F.3d at 730 (citing Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 491 F.3d 1334,
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (noting that questions of law are reviewed de novo)); Nat'l
Advanced Sys. v. United States, 26 F.3d 1107, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that
determining whether an item fits within a specific HTSUS category (classifying the
item) is a fact question and, therefore, reviewed for clear error).
86. The "HTSUS Description" consists of headings and subheadings, and an item
receives a tariff classification if the item falls within a particular HTSUS heading and
subheading. Roche Vitamins, Inc., 772 F.3d at 730; Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc.,
757 F.3d at 1377.
87. Roche Vitamins, Inc., 772 F.3d at 730-31; Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc.,
757 F.3d at 1377-78.
88. Roche Vitamins, Inc., 772 F.3d at 731 (expounding the "Explanatory Notes" rule).
89. Because of the similarity of issues, this Article does not review a few of those
cases, including Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC v. United States, 769 F.3d 1102 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Riddell,
Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014); and Link Snacks, Inc. v. United
States, 742 F.3d 962 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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(Roche).9" Roche's BetaTab product "is a mixture containing beta-
carotene, antioxidants, gelatin, sucrose, and corn starch, and can be
used as a source of Vitamin A in foods, beverages, and vitamin
products... [or as] an organic colorant with provitamin A
activity."91 As the Federal Circuit noted, "[w]hether used as a
colorant or provitamin A, beta-carotene must first be combined with
other ingredients," including certain stabilizing agents, to make any
beta-carotene product "commercially useable as either a provitamin
A or colorant."92
When Roche imported BetaTab into the United States, CBP
classified BetaTab under subheading 2106.90.97 of the HTSUS,
which pertains to "[f]ood preparations not elsewhere specified or
included."93 After CBP denied Roche's petition to reclassify BetaTab,
Roche filed suit in the Trade Court, where it argued that CBP should
classify BetaTab as "a 'coloring matter' under HTSUS subheading
3204.19.35, and eligible for duty-free entry pursuant to the
Pharmaceutical Appendix, or, alternatively, as a provitamin under
HTSUS heading 2936."94 After denying Roche's motion for summary
judgment, the Trade Court tried the case and ultimately concluded
that BetaTab should be classified under HTSUS heading 2936
(provitamins) and subheading 2930.10.00 ("Provitamins, unmixed").9
The United States appealed.96
On appeal, the Federal Circuit set forth the proper analytic
framework for classifying goods and merchandise imported into the
United States under the HTSUS. To begin with, the Federal Circuit
reviews the Trade Court's interpretation of the terms and provisions
of the HTSUS de novo, because this interpretation involves a
question of law,97 but reviews the classification of items under an
HTSUS heading or subheading for clear error, as this classification
involves a question of fact.98
90. Roche Vitamins, Inc., 772 F.3d at 729.
91. Id.
92. id. at 729-30.
93. Id. at 729 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 729-31.
96. Id. at 730.
97. Id. (citing Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 491 F.3d 1334, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
98. Id. (citing Nat'l Advanced Sys. v. United States, 26 F.3d 1107, 1109 (Fed.
Cir. 1994)).
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When items are imported into the United States, they are classified
under the HTSUS.99 With respect to the structure of the HTSUS, the
Federal Circuit explained that
[t]he HTSUS scheme is organized by headings, each of which has
one or more subheadings; the headings set forth general categories
of merchandise, and the subheadings provide a more
particularized segregation of the goods within each category. The
classification of merchandise under the HTSUS is governed by the
principles set forth in the General Rules of Interpretation ("GRIs")
and the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation.
00
Further, in determining whether an item should be classified
under a specific HTSUS heading or subheading, the Federal
Circuit stated that
GRI 1 provides that "for legal purposes, classification shall be
determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative
Section or Chapter Notes and, provided such headings or Notes do
not otherwise require, according to the [remaining GRIs.]" The
Chapter Notes are an integral part of the HTSUS, and have the
same legal force as the text of the headings.1"'
The Federal Circuit also explained that, while not considered to be
mandatory or binding authority, the Explanatory Notes for the
various HTSUS Chapters "may be consulted for guidance and are
generally indicative of the proper interpretation of a tariff provision."'°
In applying the HTSUS Analysis to Roche's BetaTab product, the
Federal Circuit noted that "BetaTab... fulfills the description in the
statutory heading and satisfies the limitations of both Note 1 to
Chapter 29 and Explanatory Note 29.36" and concluded that "no
interpretation of HTSUS terms is before us.10 3 Consequently, the
Federal Circuit upheld the Trade Court's conclusion that, as a matter
of law, "BetaTab is accurately described as a provitamin of heading
2936, subject to the limitations of Note 1 to Chapter 29 and
Explanatory Note 29.36."1°4
The Federal Circuit then reviewed, for clear error, the Trade
Court's classification of BetaTab under HTSUS subheading
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1439
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
101. Id. at 730-31 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
102. Id. at 731 (citing Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 436 F.3d 1357, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
103. Id. at 732.
104. Id.
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2936.10.00 and upheld the Trade Court's decision in that respect.10 5
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit evaluated whether
the stabilizing agents and other ingredients in BetaTab or the
manufacturing processes Roche used (including the addition of the
stabilizing agents and other ingredients) to produce BetaTab either
"(1) alter[ed] the character of the basic product [or] (2) render[ed]
it particularly suitable for specific use rather than for general use."0 6
Noting that the United States had abandoned arguments
concerning the amount of stabilizing agents present in BetaTab, the
Federal Circuit first considered whether BetaTab's ingredients or
Roche's manufacturing processes altered the character of the
underlying beta-carotene product.10 7 Citing the evidence adduced at
trial-including the testimony of the government's expert witness
"that Roche's manufacturing process does not change BetaTab's
functionality as provitamin A or change the character of the beta-
carotene as provitamin A"-the Federal Circuit held that the Trade
Court "did not clearly err in finding that the additional ingredients
and processing do not alter the character of the beta-carotene."108
The Federal Circuit then went on to consider whether BetaTab's
stabilizing agents and other ingredients or Roche's manufacturing
processes rendered BetaTab particularly suitable for a specific, rather
than a general, use.0 9 Again, the Federal Circuit pointed to
evidence in the record, including expert testimony that "[certain]
additives function as stabilizers and do not specifically prepare
[BetaTab] for tableting."" ° The court also noted that the stabilizing
agents Roche used in BetaTab "were essentially the same as those
used to stabilize other vitamins and other beta-carotene products
that were marketed for use as colorants."' Based on this evidence,
the Federal Circuit determined that "BetaTab also remains suitable
for general use.""2 Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded
105. Id. at 729, 732-33.
106. Id. at 732.
107. Id. ("Note 1 (f) to Chapter 29 permits the addition of stabilizer ingredients to




110. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 733.
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that the Trade Court "did not clearly err in finding that BetaTab
remains suitable for general use."
' 1 3
2. Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc. v. United States
The Federal Circuit in Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc. also
discussed the proper approach to classifying merchandise under the
HTSUS. Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc. ("Dependable")
imported two types of glass vases, which Dependable described "on
their respective commercial invoices as 'Generic Bud Vases' for the
smaller ('bud vases') and 'Generic Trumpet Vases' ('trumpet vases')
for the larger [vases]."1"4 The import value of the vases was low,
totaling $0.30 for the bud vases and between $0.30 and $3.00 for the
trumpet vases."5 As the Federal Circuit noted,
[a]fter importing the vases, Dependable sells them to mass-market
flower-packing houses that fill them with water and flowers. The
packing houses then ship the flower-packed vases to supermarkets
or similar retailers, where the vase and flower combinations are
displayed and sold as a single unit. Similar vases are sold empty at
retail. Dependable's vases are not sold empty at retail, though they
can be reused.
1 6
When the vases entered into the United States, Dependable
classified both types of vases under HTSUS subheading 7018.90.50,1
17
but at liquidation, CBP classified the vases under different HTSUS
subheadings."' Specifically, CBP classified the trumpet vases under
HTSUS subheading 7013.99.50.5, which has a tariff rate of thirty
percent,"9 and the bud vases under subheading 7013.99.404, which
has a tariff rate of thirty-eight percent.20 Dependable filed a protest,
113. Id.
114. Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 1374, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1375-76.
117. Id. at 1376. According to the Federal Circuit, this HTSUS subheading
covers "[g]lass beads, imitation pearls, imitation precious or semiprecious stones
and similar glass small wares and articles thereof other than imitation jewelry .
Id. at 1376 n.2.
118. Id. at 1376.
119. Id.; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED
STATES (2015) subheading 7013.99.50 (2015) (pertaining to "[g]lassware of a kind
used for table, kitchen, toilet, office, indoor decoration or similar purposes (other
than that of heading 7010 or 7018)" with a value between $0.30 and $3.00).
120. Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1376; U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, supra note 119, at subheading 7013.99.40.
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but since CBP did not act on the matter within thirty days,
Dependable's petition was denied.'1
2
Thereafter, Dependable filed an action with the Trade Court,
arguing that both of the vases should have been classified under
HTSUS heading 7010.122 As the Federal Circuit noted, HTSUS
heading 7010 "includes containers, of glass, of a kind used for the
conveyance or packing of goods."'123 The Trade Court reviewed the
HTSUS classifications proffered by Dependable and CBP, analyzed
the language of the respective HTSUS headings, and performed a
"principal use analysis" to determine under which HTSUS heading
the vases would fit.'24 After performing an analysis2 5 under United
States v. Carborundum Co.,'2 ' the Trade Court granted summary
judgment in favor of CBP and upheld CBP's classification of the
vases.'27 Dependable appealed.
128
121. Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1376.
122. Id.
123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 1376-77 & n.3. A "principal use analysis" is performed "to determine
the proper heading for the imported merchandise [under the HTSUS]." Id. at 1376
n.3 (citing Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir.
2012)). In Aromont, the Federal Circuit explained that a principal use analysis occurs
when a tariff classification heading in the HTSUS describes the way the imported
item is to be used. Aromont USA, Inc., 671 F.3d at 1312. This is opposed to an eo
nomine analysis, which is performed when the tariff classification in the HTSUS
"describes an [imported] article by a specific name, not by use." Id. (citing
CamelBak Prods., LLC v. United States, 649 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
125. Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1376 n.3 ("When, as here, the
[Trade Court] performs a principal use analysis to determine the proper heading for
the imported merchandise, the [Trade Court] analyzes several factors, commonly
referred to as the 'Carborundum factors,' in order to determine which goods are
Icommercially fungible with the imported goods."' (quoting Aromont USA, Inc., 671
F.3d at 1312-13)).
126. 536 F.2d 373 (C.C.P.A. 1976). According to the Carborundum court, the
following factors should be considered in resolving the question of whether a
commodity imported into the United States should fall within a specific type, kind,
or class of commodity:
[T] he general physical characteristics of the merchandise, the expectation of
the ultimate purchasers, the channels, class or kind of trade in which the
merchandise moves, the environment of the sale... , the use, if any, in the
same manner as merchandise which defines the class, the economic
practicality of so using the import, and the recognition in the trade of this
use. Susceptibility, capability, adequacy, or adaptability of the import to the
common use of the class is not controlling.
Id. at 377 (citations omitted).
127. Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1377.
128. Id.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit performed an HTSUS analysis,
noting that it reviews de novo those grants of summary judgment by
the Trade Court with respect to HTSUS classifications.12 The
Federal Circuit then followed the Trade Court's two-prong analysis to
analyze CBP's tariff classifications and performed an HTSUS analysis
with respect to the vases.50 Importantly, since there was no dispute as
to the nature of the goods being classified (i.e., that the items were
glass vases), "the inquiry collapse [d] into a question of law [that the
Federal Circuit] reviewled] de novo."'13
Again, the Federal Circuit undertook to explain, in detail, the
process for performing an HTSUS analysis with respect to goods
imported into the United States."3 2 The court recognized that while the
parties agreed that the vases should be classified under HTSUS chapter
70 as "glass and glassware," they disagreed about how to classify them
under a heading within the chapter.33 According to the court,
[c]urrently the subject merchandise is classified under heading
7013, which provides for "[g]lassware of a kind used for table,
kitchen, toilet, office, indoor decoration or similar purposes
(other than that of heading 7010 or 7018)." Dependable argues
the vases should be classified under heading 7010, which
includes "containers, of glass, of a kind used for the conveyance
or packing of goods."'"
After concluding that Dependable's merchandise consisted of vases
and notjust glass containers, the Federal Circuit ruled that the Trade
Court properly focused its analysis on whether Dependable's vases
should be classified under HTSUS heading 7013.' The Federal
Circuit then reviewed the Trade Court's analysis and decision to
approve CBP's classification of the vases.16  Since Dependable
challenged the Trade Court's classification of the vases under HTSUS
129. Id. (citing Lemans Corp. v. United States, 660 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Cummins Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
130. Id. (citing Lemans Corp., 66 F.3d at 1315); c.f, Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v.
United States, 491 F.3d 1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (describing how the classification
of subject goods should be reviewed for clear error because it is a factual inquiry).
131. Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Lemans Corp.,
660 F.3d at 1315).
132. Id. at 1377-78 (identifying different authorities to support the major
provisions of the HTSUS Classification Analysis).
133. Id. at 1378.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1378-79.
136. Id. at 1379.
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heading 7013, the Federal Circuit reviewed the principal use analysis
performed by the Trade Court.
1 1
7
As previously mentioned, the Trade Court had performed a
principal use analysis by applying the Carborundum factors to the
merchandise at issue.18 8  After determining that "nearly every
Carborundum factor weighs heavily in favor of classifying Dependable's
merchandise under heading 7013," the Federal Circuit upheld the
Trade Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CBP's
classifications of Dependable's vases under HTSUS subheadings
7013.99.40 (bud vases) and 7013.99.50 (trumpet vases). s
3. Deckers Corp. v. United States
In Deckers Corp., the Federal Circuit considered the proper HTSUS
classification of Teva® Sport Sandals, which Deckers Corporation
("Deckers") imported into the United States from Hong Kong.4 '
The Federal Circuit described the sandals as follows:
The Sport Sandals all have rubber or plastic soles and cloth or
textile straps in the upper portion of the shoe. Importantly, the toe
and heel sections of all of the Sports Sandals at issue are open, and
the upper section of the Sport Sandals do not fully enclose the
foot. The Sports Sandals are shoes intended [for use in] athletic
pursuits, such as running, jogging, hiking, canyoneering, and a
variety of water-based activities.1
4
1
CBP initially classified and liquidated the Sport Sandals under
HTSUS subheading 6404.19.35, with items covered under this
subheading being subject to a duty of 37.5%.142
In 2001, Deckers brought an action in the Trade Court,
143
challenging CBP's classification of the Sports Sandals and arguing
that the Sports Sandals should be classified under subheading
6404.11 (and therefore subject to a lower customs duty) because the
137. Id. at 1378-80.
138. See supra note 126 (listing the Carborundum factors).
139. Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1383.
140. Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
141. Id. (citations omitted).
142. Id. ("6404 Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or
composition leather and uppers of textile material .. " (quoting U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, supra note 119, at subheading 6404)). The Federal Circuit goes on to
quote subheading 6404.19.35 as follows: "6404.19.35 Other." Id. (quoting U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, supra note 119, at subheading 6404.19.35).
143. Deckers is the latest in a line of cases, going back to 2001, brought by Deckers
to challenge the classification of its Sport Sandals under the HTSUS. See infra note 153.
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examples appearing therein seemed to apply to the Sports Sandals.'44
According to the Federal Circuit, in order to prevail upon this claim,
the Sport Sandals "must fit the description in subheading
6404.11--they must be 'sports footwear; tennis shoes, basketball
shoes, gym shoes, training shoes and the like."" 45
At trial, the Trade Court applied an ejusdem generis analysis46 to
determine whether the "and the like" provision of 6404.11 could be
construed to cover the Sports Sandals.147 However, the Trade Court
rejected Deckers's arguments, holding that the Sports Sandals were
properly classified under subheading 6404.19.35 and not 6404.11
"because they were 'sandals,' and not 'shoes"' and that "it is for
Congress, not the courts, to alter the HTSUS provisions to cover [the
Sport Sandals] ."" Deckers appealed to the Federal Circuit, where it
argued that its Sports Sandals were properly classified under HTSUS
subheading 6404.11 because the "essential characteristic of the listed
exemplars was that they were all athletic footwear. "149
On appeal, the Federal Circuit performed its own ejusdem generis
analysis to determine whether the "and the like" provision of
subheading 6404.11 applied to the Sport Sandals.50 The Federal
Circuit rejected this interpretation because Deckers's position that
subheading 6404.11 should apply to the Sports Sandals was just a
repackaged version of its Additional Note 2 argument advanced
before the Trade Court.5' In so doing, the Federal Circuit held that
it]he evidence adduced at trial established that the fundamental
feature that the exemplars share is the design, specifically the enclosed
upper, which contains features that stabilize the foot, and protect
against abrasion and impact. Because the sandals at issue have
open toes and open heels, and lack the features of the named
144. Deckers Corp., 752 F.3d at 951-52 (indicating that subheading 6404.11
includes "[s]ports footwear; tennis shoes, basketball shoes, gym shoes, training shoes
and the like" and noting that Deckers's argument was based on Additional Note 2 to
HTSUS subheading 6404, which clarifies that subheading 6404.11 concerns "athletic
footwear" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145. Id. (emphasis added) (citing U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 119, at
subheading 6404.11).
146. Id. at 952 n.3 ("In an ejusdem generis analysis, 'where an enumeration of
specific things is followed by a general word or phrase, the general word or phrase is
held to refer to things of the same kind as those specified."' (quoting Sports
Graphics, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1994))).
147. Id. at 952 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 952-53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id. at 953.
150. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id.
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exemplars of 6404.11.80, HTSUS, the imported goods are not
classifiable under that subheading, notwithstanding their claimed
status as athletic footwear.1
52
In 2010, given the unique procedural history of the underlying
matters,53 Deckers was able to bring an action in the Trade Court,
again arguing that the Sport Sandals are properly classified under
subheading 6404.11-this time, on the basis that the Sport Sandals
"fit within the eo nomine category of 'training shoes' in subheading
6404.11."'5 However, the Trade Court again ruled against Deckers
because "the holding in Deckers I [the prior Federal Circuit case on
this issue] precluded it from classifying the Sports Sandals under
subheading 6404.11 [since] the Sports Sandals did not have
enclosed uppers."'155 As the Federal Circuit noted, "[blecause the
merchandise at issue was admittedly of the same character as in
[Deckers 1, the Court of International Trade [also] held that it was
bound by the holding of Deckers I under principles of stare
decisis.'5 6 Accordingly, Deckers appealed.5 7
On appeal, Deckers made arguments falling into two
categories.'58 First, Deckers argued that the Trade Court erred
because it did not analyze new evidence produced by Deckers and,
thereby, prevented Deckers from arguing that stare decisis should
not apply to the opinion below.'5 9 Second, Deckers argued that
the Trade Court "erred in holding that stare decisis limited its
classification decision because this appeal presents an issue of law
that was not before the panel in Deckers L ''"6" In support of its
arguments, Deckers claimed that another Federal Circuit case,
152. Id.
153. Id. (reciting the unique procedural history of the HTSUS classification
litigation concerning the Sports Sandals). As the court noted, Deckers initially filed
a test case in the Trade Court, challenging the classification of its Sport Sandals
under the HTSUS, and the Federal Circuit resolved the test case in Deckers Corp. v.
United States, 532 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Subsequently, because of procedural
matters undertaken in the test case, Deckers brought a second action to challenge
the classification of its Sports Sandals under the HTSUS, Deckers Corp. v. United States
(Deckers I), No. 02-00732, 2013 WL 1924357 (Ct. Int'l Trade Apr. 12, 2013), aff]d, 752
F.3d 949 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the action being reviewed in the instant case.
154. Deckers Corp., 752 F.3d at 953.
155. Id. (citing Deckersl, 2013 WL 1924357, at *4).
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Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States,' "permits any court-
including any subsequent panel of this court-to review a prior
interpretation of a classification provision by this court and to
disregard that interpretation upon a showing of clear error.'
1 62
The government, on the other hand, argued that "basic principles
of stare decisis and concepts of what constitutes binding precedent
prevent either the [Trade Court] or [the Federal Circuit] from
reconsidering the legal principle set forth in Deckers 1""'!s For this
reason, the government argued, the Federal Circuit could not re-visit
the holding of Deckers I because the instant appeal "involve [d] the
construction of subheading 6404.11," Deckers I already analyzed "the
term 'training shoes"' with respect to the instant appeal, and the instant
appeal "[did] not present [any] new legal issue [s]" for adjudication.'4
Agreeing with the government, the Federal Circuit affirmed.'65
In reaching this decision, the Federal Circuit cited the U.S.
Supreme Court for the proposition that "[s] tare decisis 'protects the
legitimate expectations of those who live under the law' and prevents
'an arbitrary discretion in the courts"' and also noted that the
Supreme Court has declared that stare decisis encourages
predictability and reliability in the judicial process.'66 The court added,
[s]tare decisis "deals only with law" and each prior precedential
holding of the court becomes a "statement of the law, or
precedent, binding in future cases before the same court or
another court owing obedience to its decision." Stare decisis,
therefore, is limited to only the legal determinations made in a
prior precedential opinion and does not apply to either issues of
fact, such as classification of specific goods within a construed
tariff provision, or issues of law that were not part of a holding in
a prior decision.6
7
Additionally, the Federal Circuit highlighted how it "use [s] both e0
nomine and ejusdem generis analyses to determine the common
meaning of a classification term and to establish congressional intent
161. 750 F.2d 62 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
162. Deckers Corp., 752 F.3d at 954-55.
163. Id. at 955.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
167. Id. at 956 (citations omitted).
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with respect to an HTSUS subheading."'" Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit rejected Deckers's argument and held that Deckers I involved
the construction of subheading 6404.11.169 The Federal Circuit also
rejected Deckers's claim that Schott Optical permits a Federal Circuit
panel (or the Trade Court, for that matter) to overturn the
conclusions of a previous Federal Circuit panel decision, noting that,
"[i]n this Circuit, a later panel is bound by the determinations of a
prior panel, unless relieved of that obligation by an en banc order of
the court or a decision of the Supreme Court."'7 °
However, after reviewing the historical and statutory bases behind
its unique approach to stare decisis, the Federal Circuit somewhat
modified its stare decisis jurisprudence, stating that
while a party may challenge a prior construction of a tariff
provision by a panel of this court in a classification case and may
seek to introduce evidence of purported clear error in the prior
classification to preserve the issue for potential en banc review,
both the Court of International Trade and any subsequent panel of
this court are bound by the earlier panel's classification
construction. It is only as an en banc court that [the Federal
Circuit] can review and alter a tariff classification construction by a
prior panel. This approach is consistent with [the Federal
Circuit's] treatment of stare decisis in other areas of law and is
consistent with the approach of [its] predecessor court, the
[United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals] 171
4. Belimo Automation A.G. v. United States
In Belimo Automation A. G. v. United States,172 an importer, Belimo
Automation, protested CBP's classification of several of its products as
"electric motors" under HTSUS subheading 8501.10.40, arguing that
its products should have been classified under HTSUS subheading
9032.89.60, which pertains to "automatic regulating and controlling
instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof."'73
Belimo's products, which "consist[ed] of an electric motor, gears,
168. Id. at 957. Interestingly, the Federal Circuit performed another e'usdem
generis analysis, which, while not necessary when "the common meaning of an eo
nomine term is apparent," may aid in determining congressional intent. Id. at 958.
169. Id. at 958.
170. Id. at 959.
171. See generally id. at 959-66 (describing the evolution of stare decisis in the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Federal Circuit and focusing on the
Federal Circuit's decision in Schott Optical).
172. 774 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
173. Id. at 1363 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and two printed circuit boards," were used in heating, ventilating,
and air conditioning (HVAC) systems to help maintain the
temperature set by the HVAC user.'
74
Belimo's products were unique because "they incorporate a
programmed Application Specific Integrated Circuit ('ASIC')," which
"operates independently from the central controller [of an HVAC
system] and can detect unintended changes in [the system's] damper
blade position[, thereby allowing] it to better maintain the blade's
position against disturbances."75 Although Belimo's ASIC product
allowed the HVAC system to maintain the temperature set by the
user, the ASIC also performed certain other independent functions.76
In the protest filed with CBP, Belimo argued that its products
should have been classified under HTSUS 9032.89.60 because the
ASIC "measures [air] flow indirectly, using the changes in damper
blade position as a reference"'77 and, thereby, satisfies the
requirements of clauses one and three of HTSUS Chapter 90 Note
7(a). CBP denied Belimo's protest, holding that Belimo's products
were properly classified as electric motors under HTSUS heading
8501.17' Belimo then appealed to the Trade Court, which held that
Belimo's products could not be classified under heading 9032
"because they do not automatically measure the actual value of the
temperature or any variable of air, as required by HTSUS Chapter 90,
Note 7(a)," and that Belimo's products were properly classified under
heading 8501 (electric motors).'
Noting that the interpretation of terms appearing in the HTSUS
involves "pure questions of law," the Federal Circuit reviewed the
Trade Court's classification of Belimo's products de novo.80 After
reviewing the function of the ASIC against the plain text of clauses
one and three of Note 7(a), the court reasoned that the ASIC did not
measure the actual value of airflow through the HVAC system."'
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the ASIC could not
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing Belimo Automation A.G. v. United States, No. 10-00113, 2013 WL
6439119, at *2 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 26, 2013), affd, 774 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
177. Id. at 1363, 1365.
178. Id. at 1364.
179. Id. at 1364, 1366 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. at 1364.
181. Id. at 1364-65.
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be categorized under heading 9032, thereby rejecting Belimo's
argument that the ASIC indirectly measures airflow. 1
8 2
Having thus rejected Belimo's arguments that the ASIC should be
classified under heading 9032, the Federal Circuit moved on to
consider whether the ASIC should be classified under heading
8501.183 In performing this analysis, the Federal Circuit reviewed
Note 3 to Section XVI, which includes HTSUS heading 8501 and states,
in relevant part, that "machines designed for the purpose of performing
two or more complementary or alternative functions are to be
classified as ... that machine which performs the principal function."'
84
Observing that the ASIC possessed additional functions to enhance
the "precision and reliability of the" HVAC system damper blade
actuator's motor operation, the Federal Circuit concluded that such
functions were "complementary" to the device's principle function
"to assist in moving the damper blades."'1 5 Consequently, the Federal
Circuit upheld the classification of Belimo's products as motors
under HTSUS heading 8501.186
5. GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States
In GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States,187 the Federal Circuit reviewed
a decision of the Trade Court with respect to CBP's classification of
screws under the HTSUS 88 GRK imported three models of screws,
all of which, according to the Federal Circuit, "are made with
corrosion-resistant case-hardened steel, and.. . are marketed for use
in carpentry as building material fasteners."'89  Each model is
"available in a variety of lengths, diameters, and thread designs."'90
One model, GRK's R4 screw, was designed with "a flat self-
countersinking head designed to cut away at the top layer of the
material as the screw is driven into place."'' The other models, the
"RT and Fin/Trim screws [,] are recommended for fine carpentry and
trim applications, and.., have much smaller heads that.. . prevent
182. Id. at 1365-66.
183. Id. at 1366.
184. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 761 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
188. Id. at 1355.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1356.
191. Id. at 1355 (footnote omitted).
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the screws from cracking and splitting the target material.'' 92 The
Federal Circuit further stated that the "RT screws, unlike Fin/Trim
screws, include reverse threading, a second set of threads near the
head that allows the head to be less noticeable along the surface of
the target material."'93
In 2008, GRK imported these screws into the United States.194 At
that time, the CBP classified the screws under the "other wood
screws" heading of the HTSUS, which resulted in the assessment of a
12.5% ad valorem duty at liquidation.' GRK protested to CBP,
claiming that their screws should have been classified under the "self-
tapping screws" heading of the HTSUS, which would have resulted in
the assessment of a 6.2% ad valorem duty on the import of these
screws. 96 CBP denied GRK's protest, and GRK challenged CBP's
decision in the Trade Court.19 7 Both parties moved for summary
judgment, and the Trade Court ultimately sustained GRK's
challenge and permitted its screws to be classified as "self-tapping
screws" under the HTSUS.'198
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Trade Court.199 To
begin with, the Federal Circuit noted that both parties agreed that
the terms "other wood screws" and "self-tapping screws" were eo
nomine provisions under the HTSUS and that eo nomine provisions
without limiting terms generally "include all forms of the named
article."200 The court explained that "[a]lthough an eo nomine
provision generally 'describes the merchandise by name, not by use,'
such a provision may be limited by use when 'the name itself
inherently suggests a type of use."'20 In those cases, such items may
fall outside of eo nomine classification and require the Trade Court to
perform a use analysis to properly classify them.20 2 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court's classification of GRK's
screws and remanded the case to the Trade Court for further
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1355-56.
194. Id. at 1356.
195. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1356-57.
199. Id. at 1361.
200. Id. at 1357-58 (quoting Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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proceedings.20 3  In so doing, the Federal Circuit denied GRK's
petition for rehearing.
24
6. Alcan Food Packaging (Shelbyville) v. United States
In Alcan Food Packaging (Shelbyville) v. United States,205 the Federal
Circuit reviewed a decision of the Trade Court concerning the
proper classification of Flexalcon, an aluminum-plastic laminated
food-packaging product imported by Alcan Food Packaging
(Shelbyville) ("Alcan"). 2 6  Alcan imported Flexalcon for use in
packaging Meals Ready to Eat ("MREs") used by the U.S. Armed
Forces.207 According to the Federal Circuit, Flexalcon "is a flat, multi-
layer material that comes in two configurations: a four-layer material
for the base of a package and a three-layer material for the lid. Each
configuration has a thin layer of aluminum foil sandwiched between
layers of plastic."
2 8
The court also emphasized that each layer of Flexalcon, together
with the material chosen for use in that particular layer, plays an
important role in "the military's requirements for flexible food
packaging.'209 For example, the court noted that the plastic layers
allow the packaging to be sterilized and sealed with an air-tight seal,
adding strength and preventing the material failures that can occur
with aluminum foil, while the aluminum layers serve as robust
barriers, "substantially prevent[ing] the penetration of light, water
vapor, oxygen, and other harmful contaminants that would degrade
the packaging's food contents.
210
Alcan imported Flexalcon into the United States, classifying it
under HTSUS subheading 7607.20.50, which does not have a duty
rate.21' Subsequently, CBP reclassified Flexalcon under HTSUS
subheading 3921.90.40, which has a duty rate of 4.2%.212 Alcan filed
203. Id. at 1361.
204. Id.
205. 771 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
206. Id. at 1364-65.




211. Id. ("[A]luminum foil (whether or not printed, or backed with paper,
paperboard, plastics or similar backing materials) of a thickness (excluding any
backing) not exceeding 0.2 mm: Backed: Other." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
212. Id. ("[O]ther plates, sheets, film, foil and strip, of plastics: Other: Flexible."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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a protest of the reclassification with CBP, which CPB denied.2 13 Alcan
then filed suit in the Trade Court, arguing that Flexalcon was
properly classified under subheading 7607.20.50 rather than
subheading 3921.90.40.214 However, on summary judgment, the
Trade Court ruled in favor of the government, and Alcan appealed.
215
The Federal Circuit applied the HTSUS analysis set forth in Roche
and Dependable Packaging and held that Flexalcon was properly
classified under heading 3921.216 In determining whether to classify
Flexalcon under HTSUS heading 3921 or 7607, the Federal Circuit
indicated that it was required to interpret the HTSUS classification
headings under the GRIs.217 Consequently, the court proceeded to
apply the GRIs in numerical order, observing that if one rule sufficed
to resolve the classification question, it was unnecessary to resort to
subsequent rules. In conducting this analysis, the court began with
GRI 1.218 Under GRI 1,
The classification of merchandise under the HTSUS is governed by
the principles set forth in the GRIs [(General Rules of
Interpretation)] and the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation.
We apply the GRIs in numerical order; if a particular rule resolves
the classification issue, we do not look to subsequent rules.
GRI 1 says, in relevant part, that "classification shall be
determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative
section or chapter notes." When GRI 1 does not resolve the issue
of "classification of goods consisting of more than one material or
substance," GRI 2(b) requires application of "the principles of rule
3." Rule 3 states three rules for composite goods that primafacie fit
within multiple headings: first, the heading that more specifically
describes the goods applies, GRI 3(a); second, if no heading is
more specific, then the goods are "classified as if they consisted of
the material or component which gives them their essential
character," GRI 3(b); third, if the first two options fail to decide the
issue, the goods are classified under the applicable heading that
occurs last in numerical order, GRI 3(c).1l9
Here, since Flexalcon "is made of laminated layers of aluminum
and plastic," the Federal Circuit was confronted with performing a
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1365-66.
216. Id. at 1367.
217. Id. at 1366.
218. Id.
219. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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classification analysis on a composite product.220 In performing this
analysis, the Federal Circuit began by considering "whether Flexalcon
is classifiable according to the headings and notes under either
heading 3921 or 7607.'221 If Flexalcon was properly classified under
heading 3921, then, under GR 1, the court would not need to
proceed further.
222
Turning to the HTSUS, the court noted that "[h]eading 3921
covers '[o]ther plates, sheets, film, foil and strip, of plastics.' This use
of 'other' refers to, and thus gathers meaning from, what comes
before. Heading 3920 reaches '[o]ther plates, sheets, film, foil and
strip, of plastics.... laminated, supported or similarly combined with
other materials.'' 223 Indeed, the Federal Circuit found clear "[t]he
implication ... that heading 3921 covers relevant 'other' plastic
goods excluded from 3920 by the phrase after 'plastics'-that is, it
covers plastic goods that ... are.., laminated, supported or similarly
combined with other materials.'224  Applying GR 1, the Federal
Circuit concluded that Flexalcon was properly classified under
HTSUS heading 3921.225
The Federal Circuit then went on to confront Alcan's argument
that Flexalcon should have been classified under heading 7607
because "Flexalcon is backed aluminum foil as described in heading
7607, [and] that aluminum gives Flexalcon its essential
character .... ",226 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that a limiting instruction on the face of heading 7607 allows
classification under another HTSUS heading.227  That provision
reads, in relevant part, "heading 7607 appl[ies], inter alia, to plates,
sheets, strip and foil with patterns... and [1] to such products which
have been perforated, corrugated, polished or coated, [2] provided
that they do not thereby assume the character of articles or products
of other headings.'228 Consequently, the Federal Circuit held that




223. Id. at 1366-67 (alterations in original) (U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note
119, at heading 3921).
224. Id. at 1367 (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1366.
227. Id. at 1367.
228. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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heading 7607 when it assumes the character of an article covered by
another heading-in this case, heading 3921. °229
Applying these rules to HTSUS heading 3921, the Federal Circuit
concluded that Flexalcon was properly classified under HTSUS
heading 3921.23
1
III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVIEW OF ANTIDUMPING DUTY AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES HEARD BY THE TRADE COURT
A. Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
The purpose of the AD and CVD statutes set forth in the Tariff Act
is to mitigate and ultimately to prevent certain types of economic
injury to U.S. industries.231 Under the Tariff Act, the AD statutes seek
to prevent economic injury to U.S. industries resulting from the sale
of imported merchandise in the United States at less than fair
value.22 These lower prices cause or threaten to cause material injury
to, and threaten the development of, industries in the United
States.233 Similarly, the CVD statutes of the Tariff Act seek to prevent
economic injuries to U.S. industries when a government or public
entity of a foreign country subsidizes "the manufacture, production,
or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold... for
importation, into the United States.'234 Such subsidization may cause
or threaten to cause "material injury" to or "materially retard[]" the
development of an industry in the United States.5
When an "interested party"23 6 files a petition with Commerce
(which is normally dual-filed with USITC)237 alleging that a foreign
government is providing a countervailable subsidy to producers or
importers of merchandise to be imported into the United States, or
that an importer has dumped imported merchandise into the
229. Id. at 1368.
230. Id. at 1367-68.
231. See Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations, U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, http://www.usitc.gov/press-room/usad.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)
(explaining the purpose of the AD and CVD statutes). See generally 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-1677n (2012) (containing the federal AD and CVD statutes).
232. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
233. Id.
234. Id. § 1671 (a)(1).
235. Id. § 1671 (a) (2).
236. Id. § 1677(9) (defining the term "interested party" as including, among
others, foreign manufacturers that export merchandise to the United States and the
governments of the countries wherein those foreign manufacturers are located).
237. See id. § 1671a(b) (2) (CVD); see also id. § 1673a(b) (2) (AD).
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United States,3 the USITC and Commerce conduct parallel
investigations. If, at the completion of those parallel investigations,
the USITC and Commerce have made the requisite findings, then
"Commerce may issue orders imposing duties on imports of goods




B. Judicial Review of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings
After USITC and Commerce have completed their respective
AD/CVD investigations and made the requisite findings or after
USITC and Commerce have made certain decisions regarding an AD
or CVD investigation, an aggrieved party may file a civil action with
the Trade Court.40 As noted above, the Trade Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to review the performance and outcome of AD/CVD
proceedings at Commerce and the USITC, including the imposition
of AD/CVD orders.241 In turn, the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction to review appeals of interlocutory and final decisions of
the Trade Court, including second-level appellate review of Trade
Court decisions concerning the Trade Court's review of AD/CVD
proceedings before the USITC and Commerce.242
C. Federal Circuit Review of Antidumping Duty and Countervailing
Duty Cases
In 2014, the Federal Circuit reviewed seventeen Trade Court cases
concerning antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders and
related matters under the Tariff Act. Eleven of those cases involved
AD-related matters only.243  Three cases, including Guangdong
238. Id. §§ 1671(a), 1673-1673a(a) (1).
239. Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States, 755 F.3d 912, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
240. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1)-(2) (establishing the requirements and process
for judicial review of decisions not to continue investigating as well as determinations
made on the record).
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (c).
242. Id. §§ 1292(c)(1), 1295(a)(5).
243. See generally Thai Plastic Bags Indus. Co. v. United States, 774 F.3d 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); Home Meridian Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Mukand, Ltd. v. United States, 767 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Peer Bearing Co.-
Changshan v. United States, 766 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Michaels Stores, Inc. v.
United States, 766 F.3d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Qingdao Sea-Line Trading Co. v.
United States, 766 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Lifestyle Enter., Inc. v. United States,
751 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Mueller Comercial de Mex., S. de R.L. de C.V. v.
United States, 753 F.3d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Thai Plastic Bags Indus. Co. v. United
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Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co. v. United States, the case that
considered whether an amendment to the Tariff Act violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution, addressed both AD- and
CVD-related matters,244 and the remaining three cases addressed
CVD-related matters only.245 Of these seventeen cases, the Federal
Circuit affirmed twelve cases and reversed or vacated the remaining five.
This Part first reviews Guangdong Wireking given the constitutional
question addressed therein. Then, this Part reviews several of the
Federal Circuit 2014 opinions246 pertaining to Commerce's use of
adverse inferences against importers (or their governments) for
failing to cooperate with AD/CVD investigations247 as well as several
of the court's opinions that discuss Commerce's methods for
calculating AD/CVD rates. Finally, this Part reviews several of the
court's other 2014 AD/CVD opinions because they provide insight
into the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence on various issues that can
arise in the AD/CVD context.
248
States, 746 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Marvin Furniture (Shanghai) Co. v. United
States, 744 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
244. See generally Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States, 755 F.3d 912; Guangdong
Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co., Ltd. v. United States, 745 F.3d 1194 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); Wind Tower Trade Coal. v. United States, 741 F.3d 89 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
245. See generally Essar Steel, Ltd. v. United States, 753 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Ltd. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States, 753 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
246. The court's decision in Essar Steel, Ltd., 753 F.3d 1368, is not reviewed in
this Article.
247. As used in this Article, the term "adverse inferences" means the range of
sanctions described in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677-1677n that Commerce may use when an
"interested party," as defined in § 1677(9), engages in certain misconduct in
connection with an AD/CVD investigation. The adverse inferences available to
Commerce include, inter alia, using "facts otherwise available" if a party withholds or
fails to properly provide Commerce with certain information or otherwise impedes
the investigation, see § 1677e(a) (2); drawing inferences "adverse to the interests of
[a] party" if that party fails to cooperate with Commerce during the investigation, see
§ 1677e(b); declining to use evidence based on business proprietary information if
the party fails to make that information available to Commerce, see § 1677f(b)-(c); or
disregarding any information appearing in a deficient response provided to
Commerce, see§ 1677m(d).
248. Cases not discussed herein include Thai Plastic Bags Indus. Co., 774 F.3d 1366;
Home Meridian Int'l, Inc., 772 F.3d 1289; Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 772 F.3d 1281; Qingdao
Sea-Line Trading Co., 766 F.3d 1378; MacLean-Fogg Co., 753 F.3d 1237; Lifestyle Enter.,
Inc., 751 F.3d 1371; Thai Plastic Bags Indus. Co., 746 F.3d 1358; and Marvin Furniture
(Shanghai) Co., 744 F.3d 1319.
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1. Guangdong Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co. v. United States
In Guangdong Wireking, the Federal Circuit considered whether a
2012 revision of the Tariff Act violated the U.S. Constitution when
the Act increased the scope and amount of AD/CVD rates imposed
on certain items imported from China.49 In 2012, Congress passed
an amendment o the Tariff Act that legislatively overruled a decision
reached by the Federal Circuit in an earlier case.25°
The Federal Circuit noted that prior to the 2012 amendment, the
United States did not have an explicit law on how to levy
countervailing duties on non-market economy (NME) countries and
that Commerce had stated it would not impose such duties.251 In
2007, however, Commerce changed course and stated that it would
begin levying countervailing duties on products imported from
China, a NME country.252
This policy change triggered the GPX International Tire Corp. v.
United States253 litigation. In that 2011 case, two Chinese tire
manufacturers argued that countervailing duties imposed on their
tires were illegitimate since Commerce could not levy such a duty on
imports originating from China.254 After reviewing the history of the
Tariff Act and looking at its subsequent amendments and
reenactments, the court concluded that "in amending and reenacting
the trade laws in 1988 and 1994, Congress adopted [Commerce's]
position that countervailing duty law does not apply to NME
countries .... The court then affirmed the holding of the Trade
Court, concluding that countervailing duties did not apply to imports
from NME countries.256
However, in 2012, Congress enacted new legislation that
"permitted the imposition of both antidumping and countervailing
duties with respect to importers from [NME] countries.
25 7
Specifically, the Federal Circuit observed that the new legislation
required that Commerce reduce the duty levied on goods from an
NME market in cases of "double count[ing]," instances where,
249. 745 F.3d 1194, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
250. Id. (citing GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir.
2011), reh'ggranted, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
251. Id. at 1197.
252. Id.
253. 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh'ggranted, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
254. Guangdong Wireking, 745 F.3d at 1197 (citing GPX Int'l Tire Co., 666 F.3d at 735).
255. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting GPXInt'l Tire Co., 666 F.3d at 745).
256. Id. (citing GPX Int'l Tire Co., 666 F.3d at 745).
257. Id. at 1196.
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because of a single unfair trade advantage, both AD and CVD duties
are applied to the goods.2"' "This double-counting provision
applies only prospectively to proceedings initiated after March 13,
2012" but not to any CVD-related proceedings initiated prior to
that date.259 Hence, CVD-related proceedings "initiated between
November 20, 2006, and March 13, 2012, are subject to both
antidumping and countervailing duties but do not benefit from
this double-counting adjustment.
26 °
Around the time the new legislation went into effect, Guangdong
Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co., Ltd. ("Wireking"), a Chinese
importer, was a "mandatory respondent" for AD and CVD
investigations by Commerce in August of 2008 with respect to
"certain kitchen appliance shelving and racks from China."261 In
these investigations, Commerce reviewed Wireking's imports for all of
2007 and for the first half of 2008 (January 1, 2008 through June 30,
2008).262 Thereafter, on July 24 and 27, 2009, Commerce issued AD
and CVD orders based in part on the results of these investigations.
263
According to the Federal Circuit, in order to determine the
antidumping margin and the applicable CVD duty rate, Commerce
performed the NME analysis required by the statute at hat time.26
Instead of using the "actual home market prices for the inputs
Wireking used to manufacture its kitchen shelving and racks,
Commerce calculated the margin using a higher, 'normal value' for
the product's inputs based on market economy values of the
inputs."265 Commerce then determined that Wireking's input was
steel wire rod.266 As such, Commerce used the "normal value" of the
steel wire rods as a surrogate to determine the home market price of
Wireking's imported goods 7.26  This calculation yielded a 95.99%
antidumping duty rate.2
258. Id. at 1197.
259. Id. at 1197-98 (emphasis in original).
260. Id. at 1198.
261. Id. A mandatory respondent is an exporter required to fill out a






267. Id. at 1199 (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Id.
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Commerce also levied a 13.30% countervailing duty against
Wireking.69 The court reasoned that the majority of this duty could
be attributed to the price difference between the delivered world
market price and the price that Wireking paid for wire rod produced
by the Chinese government during the period. v0 Commerce divided
the duty by Wireking's total sales and calculated Wireking's net
countervailable subsidy rate to be 11.76%, a penalty for the wire rod
subsidy it had received.271
Subsequently, Wireking challenged Commerce's methodology for
developing the antidumping margin and imposed CVD rate. In so
doing, "Wireking contended that the 'simultaneous imposition of
these special NME [antidumping] measures and market economy
[countervailing duty] measures ... demonstrates the imposition of a
double remedy' and was improper.'272  Commerce rejected this
argument and imposed a net CVD rate of 13.30%.
Thereafter, on October 15, 2009, Wireking filed an action in the
Trade Court to appeal Commerce's AD and CVD determinations
against it.273 Since Wireking's case raised issues similar to those being
litigated in GPX International Tire Corp., the Trade Court stayed the
action in its court "pending the outcome of the GPX proceedings."
2 74
The GPX litigation finally concluded on May 16, 2012, approximately
three months after Congress passed the NME Amendment.
275
Following the GPX litigation, Wireking amended its complaint,
raising the constitutional issues present in the instant case.276 The
Trade Court ruled in favor of the government, holding that
although Commerce imposed both AD and CVD duties on
Wireking, Commerce's actions were not penal.277 As a result,
Commerce's actions "did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause even
if [they] were retroactive."
2 78
Wireking appealed to the Federal Circuit, which upheld the Trade
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did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. '79
As the Federal Circuit explained,
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the Constitution states "[n]o Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." A law only violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause if it (1) applies retroactively and (2)
imposes a punishment for an act that was not punishable at the
time it was committed or increases the punishment for an act that
was committed before the new law was enacted.
20
Noting that the AD and CVD investigations were initiated in 2008,
that the NME Amendment was passed in 2012, and that the NME
Amendment was "[d]esigned to reach all NME countervailing duty
proceedings that were 'initiated... on or after November 20, 2006,"'
the Federal Circuit concluded that the NME Amendment "applies
retroactively to Wireking's imports before the 2012 legislation."
281
Hence, the only remaining question was whether the NME
Amendment constituted legislation of a penal nature.282 Given that
the NME Amendment was retroactive, the NME Amendment would
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution if it were also
found to be penal in nature.283
Although the Tariff Act and the NME Amendment "are civil in
nature," the Federal Circuit stated that "in rare circumstances, the
Supreme Court has held that a civil law violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause because the law was punitive."284 The court analyzed the NME
Amendment under the Supreme Court's approach outlined in Smith
v. Doe,285 where the Court articulated a seven-part standard for
assessing when a civil law is punitive and violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause.286 According to the Federal Circuit, the Smith test is "exacting
and difficult to satisfy.
' 28 7
279. Id. at 1207.
280. Id. at 1200 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3).
281. Id. (alteration in original).
282. Id. at 1202.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
286. Guangdong Wireking, 745 F.3d. at 1202-03.
287. Id. at 1203. The seven factors are whether the action (1) has traditionally
been considered a punishment, (2) "imposes an affirmative disability or restraint,"
(3) promotes the goals of punishment, (4) is rationally connected to a non-penal
purpose, (5) is excessive compared to its purpose, (6) requires a finding of scienter
for application, and (7) applies to criminal actions. Id. at 1204 (quoting Smith, 538
U.S. at 97, 105) (internal quotations omitted).
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After applying the Smith test, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the NME Amendment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause,
reasoning that "Wireking has not shown, let alone by the clearest
proof, that the absence of a retrospective double-counting provision
negates the law's predominantly remedial impact.""2 s Consequently,
the Federal Circuit held that the NME Amendment was not penal
and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.289
2. Opinions pertaining to the use of adverse inferences for non-cooperation
in AD/CVD investigations
a. Mukand, Ltd. v. United States
In Mukand, Ltd. v. United States,290 Mukand, Ltd., an importer of
stainless steel from India, appealed a decision of the Trade Court29
approving Commerce's application of adverse facts available ("AFA")
against Mukand in connection with a review of an outstanding AD
order.292 In March of 2010, and pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a),
Commerce initiated an administrative review of an existing AD order
involving stainless steel imports from India.293  As part of that
investigation, Commerce issued investigatory questionnaires seeking
certain information related to, inter alia, the production costs
associated with producing stainless steel bar to calculate the
antidumping margin applicable to Mukand.294
In Mukand's responses to the questionnaires, Commerce noted
certain discrepancies and informed Mukand that Commerce did not
find Mukand's methodologies to be reasonable.295 In the alternative,
Commerce requested that Mukand explain its methodologies and
reasons.296  Although Mukand responded to this request and
provided Commerce with supplemental information, Commerce
remained unsatisfied with Mukand's responses.297 Finally, Commerce
"warned [Mukand] that [fiailure to provide the requested
288. Id. at 1207.
289. Id.
290. 767 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
291. Mukand, Ltd. v. United States, No. 11-00401, 2013 WL 1339399 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Mar. 25, 2013), affd, 767 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
292. Mukand, Ltd., 767 F.3d at 1302, 1308.
293. Id. at 1302.
294. Id. at 1302-03.
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information may result in [Commerce] deciding to rely on facts
available, as required by section 776(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, in [Commerce's] preliminary results."'2 98  Mukand
responded as it had before and "conclud[ed] that there is no
reasonable and verifiable way to do what is requested."2 99
Concluding that Mukand's responses to its requests were deficient,
Commerce determined Mukand's antidumping duty rate by using
other facts available to it.300 As the Federal Circuit notes:
In its preliminary results, Commerce applied an adverse
inference against Mukand after concluding that Mukand (i)
repeatedly failed to provide product-specific cost data by size; (ii)
failed to provide a meaningful explanation of why it could not
provide such data; and (iii) failed to provide factual information
supporting its claim that product size did not significantly affect
production cost. Commerce noted that requesting product-specific
cost data is standard procedure, and that a respondent has a duty
to provide a full explanation and suggested alternative forms if it is
unable to provide requested information. Accordingly, Commerce
concluded that applying AFA against Mukand wasjustified.3 1
Ultimately, Commerce applied an ad valorem AFA rate of 21.02% to
Mukand's imports, and Mukand filed an appeal with the Trade Court.1
2
Noting that Commerce repeatedly asked Mukand to provide
specific information and to explain the methodology used in
Mukand's responses, the Trade Court affirmed the imposition of the
AFA rate by Commerce and rejected Mukand's argument that, in the
alternative, Commerce should have applied a partial AFA rate.30 3
Mukand then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the
decision of the Trade Court upholding the application of the AFA
rate imposed by Commerce.0 4
To begin with, the Federal Circuit "review[s] decisions of the Trade
Court de novo and appl[ies] anew the same standard used by the
Trade Court."3 5 With respect to the antidumping determinations
made by Commerce, the Federal Circuit stated that
298. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted).
299. Id., at 1303-04 (internal quotation mark omitted),
300. Id. at 1304 (citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677e(b), 1677m(d)-(e) (2012)).
301. Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
302. Id. at 1304-05.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1308.
305. Id. at 1305-06.
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Commerce's antidumping determinations are reviewed for
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as "more than
a mere scintilla," as well as evidence that a "reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Our review is limited
to the record before Commerce in the particular review
proceeding at issue and includes all evidence that supports or
detracts from Commerce's conclusion. An agency finding may still
be supported by substantial evidence even if two inconsistent
conclusions can be drawn from the evidence.s 6
With respect to Commerce's decision to impose an AFA rate upon
on importer by relying on other facts available to it, the Federal
Circuit stated that
Commerce may further rely on an adverse inference against a
respondent when selecting among the facts otherwise available if it
concludes that the respondent failed to cooperate to the best of its
ability. The "best of its ability" standard requires the respondent o
put forth its maximum effort to investigate and obtain full and




Applying this standard, the Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce's
decision to "resort to facts otherwise available and to apply an adverse
inference against Murkand," noting that substantial evidence existed
to support the conclusion that Mukand failed to provide the
information requested by Commerce °.3 " Further, the Federal Circuit
noted that "Commerce's decision to adopt an adverse inference
against Mukand [was] also supported by substantial evidence[,
because] Commerce reasonably concluded that Mukand failed to
cooperate to the best of its ability when responding to Commerce's
requests for information."0 9  Consequently, substantial evidence
existed to support Commerce's imposition of a total AFA rate, rather
than a partial AFA rate, against Mukand.1 0
b. Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States
Like Mukand, in Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States (Peer
II) 311 Commerce applied an adverse inference when an importer
306. Id. at 1306 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
307. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (2012)).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1307.
311. 766 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Peer Bearing is the latest in a line of cases
dating back to 2007, when Commerce initiated "the twentieth administrative review
of the antidumping duty order on tapered roller bearings and parts thereof, finished
and unfinished ('TRBs'), from the People's Republic of China ('PRC'), covering the
20151
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failed to act to the best of its ability in complying with a request for
information in connection with an administrative review of an
antidumping order. 12 Commerce initiated an administrative review
of an AD order pertaining to tapered roller bearings imported by
Peer Bearing Company-Changshan ("CPZ"). 1  In connection with
this review, Commerce issued investigative questionnaires to CPZ "to
identify whether its sales of bearings qualified either as export price
(EP) sales or as constructed export price (CEP) sales,'3 14 which
Commerce uses to determine the price to be used when it calculates
the antidumping margin with respect to the bearings.15 In response
to the questionnaires, CPZ provided CEP sales data for the bearings
but did not provide any EP sales data.316
The Timken Company ("Timken"), a domestic bearing producer,
requested that Commerce require CPZ to provide the EP sales data,
but Commerce chose to calculate CPZ's antidumping margin using
the CEP sales data.317 However, Commerce later changed course and
calculated CPZ's antidumping margin using the EP sales data.1
Because CPZ had only provided Commerce with CEP sales data, the
EP sales data was necessarily limited. 19  Ultimately, Commerce
period June 1, 2006, through May 31, 2007." Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts
Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, from the People's Republic of China:
Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 73 Fed. Reg.
41,033, 41,033 (July 17, 2008). The related cases include Peer Bearing Co.-
Changshan v. United States, No. 09-00052, 2013 WL 4615134 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug.
30, 2013) (Peer III), vacated, 766 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Peer Bearing Co.-
Changshan v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2012) (Peer I);
Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2011) (Peer 1); and Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and
Unfinished, from the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 3987 (Jan. 22, 2009).
312. Peer III, 766 F.3d at 1397-99.
313. Id. at 1397.
314. As the Peer Bearing court explained, "[i]f CPZ's sales are properly classified as
EP sales, Commerce uses data reflecting the price of CPZ's sales to its unaffiliated U.S.
importer.... If CPZ's sales are properly classified as CEP sales, Commerce uses data
reflecting the price of Peer's sales to its U.S. customers." Id. at 1397-98 (emphasis
added); see 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a)-(b) (2012) (defining export price and constructed
export price, respectively).
315. Peer I, 766 F.3d at 1397-98.
316. Id. at 1398. Specifically, as the Federal Circuit noted, "CPZ responded that its
sales were properly classified as CEP sales and provided Commerce with the CEP data
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determined that the appropriate antidumping margin, based on the
limited subset of EP sales data, was 92.84%.320 Subsequently, the
Trade Court overturned the EP-based antidumping margin imposed
on CPZ, held that the methods used by Commerce were contrary to
law, and remanded the matter back to Commerce.
321
On remand, Commerce requested that CPZ provide the EP sales
data that Commerce would use to calculate the antidumping margin
to be applied to CPZ.122  However, during the course of the
administrative review of the applicable AD order, CPZ had been sold,
and CPZ was unable to produce the EP sales data.323 Nonetheless,
Commerce determined that CPZ was responsible for maintaining
access to the EP data during the course of the entire proceeding
because the need for the EP sales data had been raised on the record
during the proceedings below.324 Accordingly, Commerce concluded
that CPZ failed to cooperate to the best of its ability, assessed the
antidumping margin applicable to CPZ by using AFA, and imposed
an AFA antidumping margin of 60.95% against CPZ.1
25
The Trade Court reviewed the matter again on appeal and ruled
against Commerce.26  This time, the Trade Court held that
Commerce erroneously applied AFA based on CPZ's failure to
"maintain access to the EP data" because Commerce's expectations
regarding CPZ's obligation to maintain access to data were
unreasonable.127 For this reason, concluded the Trade Court, the
statutory requirements giving rise to the use by Commerce of AFA
were not satisfied, and the Trade Court again remanded the case
back to Commerce.8
Commerce, on this second remand, again concluded that the
antidumping margin for CPZ should be calculated on the basis of the
EP sales data, which, as noted above, was limited, since CPZ had only
320. Id.
321. Id. (citing Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States (Peer 1), 752 F. Supp.




325. Id. at 1398-99 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (2012)).
326. Id. at 1399 (citing Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States (Peer I), 853
F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1373 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2012)).
327. Id.
328. Id. The Trade Court "held that 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b), which allows for the
application of adverse facts available if a party fails to act 'to the best of its ability to
comply with a request for information,' does not apply to requests that the party has
yet to receive." Id. (quoting PeerII, 853 F. Supp. 2d, at 1374).
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provided Commerce with CEP sales data without EP sales data.1
29
Hence, Commerce determined that CPZ's antidumping margin
should be 6.52% based on the CEP sales data provided to Commerce,
which the Trade Court upheld.3 Timken then filed the instant
appeal with the Federal Circuit."3 '
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court's decision
in Peer III and remanded, instructing the Trade Court to "reinstate
Commerce's application of the adverse facts available and its
calculation of CPZ's margin" at the 60.95% rate.332 Again, the
Federal Circuit reviews a Trade Court decision "evaluating an
antidumping determination by Commerce by reapplying the
statutory standard of review that the [Trade Court] applied in
reviewing the administrative record."'3 Further, the Federal Circuit
will "uphold Commerce's determination unless it is unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record or otherwise not in accordance
with the law."334
In reversing the Trade Court, the Federal Circuit cited 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677e(b) for the proposition that "Commerce may 'use an
inference that is adverse to the interests of [a] party' (i.e., apply
adverse facts available against the party) when it determines that the
party 'has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to
comply with a request for information.'-3 35 In construing the "best of
its ability" provision in § 1677e(b), the Federal Circuit noted that it
has "[previously] held that the 'best of its ability' provision 'requires
that importers.., take reasonable steps to keep and maintain full
and complete records documenting the information that a
reasonable importer should anticipate being called upon to
produce.'3 36 Further, the Federal Circuit noted that it has also
previously held that "the information an importer must maintain
[under the best of its ability provision] can include information
requested for the first time on remand."
33 7
329. Id.
330. Id. (citing Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States (Peer III), No. 09-






335. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)).
336. Id. at 1399-1400 (second alteration in original) (quoting Nippon Steel Corp.
v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
337. Id. at 1400.
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Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that substantial
evidence supported the conclusion that "CPZ did not act to the best
of its ability to comply with Commerce's request, even though that
request came for the first time on remand," and that "CPZ failed to
cooperate to the best of its ability by not maintaining access to the EP
data throughout the course of the proceeding."3 8 With respect to
the § 16773(b) "best of its ability" provision, the Federal Circuit
further held that "Commerce has established that a reasonable
importer would have been on notice that EP data was relevant to the
proceeding and may be requested by Commerce," and therefore,
"under these circumstances, where the importer knew there was a
dispute over whether to use EP or CEP data, a reasonable importer
would know that it needed to maintain both." 9 Consequently, ruled
the Federal Circuit, "[f]ailure to maintain access to [this] data
may... result in a determination that the importer has failed to act
to the best of its ability in responding to a request for the data and an
application of adverse facts available against the importer.
3 40
c. Mueller Comercial de Mexico, S. de RL. de C.V. v. United States
Mueller Comercial de Mexico, S. de R.L. de C. V. v. United States341 also
involved a lawsuit challenging Commerce's application of an adverse
inference in connection with the administrative review of an existing
AD order.342 In 2009, pursuant to a request from Mueller Comercial
de Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. and a related subsidiary ("Mueller"),
Commerce initiated a review of a 1992 AD order "on certain circular
welded non-alloy steel pipe from Mexico" and issued investigative
questionnaires to Muller, Tuberia Nacional, S.A. de C.V. ("TUNA"),
Ternium Mexico, S.A. de C.V. ("Ternium"), and others.43
Ultimately, Commerce decided that it needed to calculate
Mueller's antidumping margin. As the Federal Circuit noted, "Eflor
Commerce to calculate Mueller's antidumping rate, it was required to
determine the difference between the 'normal value' of Mueller's
goods (typically 'home market' price) and the 'export price' at which
Mueller's goods were sold in the United States.'344 Although Mueller
had a sufficient amount of data regarding the home market price of
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1400-01.
340. Id. at 1401.
341. 753 F.3d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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Mueller's goods, in order to calculate its antidumping margin,
Commerce requested additional information, including production
cost information.3 45  Despite fully cooperating with Commerce,
Mueller lacked access to all of the production cost information, and
Commerce requested this information from Mueller's suppliers,
Ternium and TUNA.
3 46
Although TUNA also fully cooperated with respect to the requests
for production cost information issued by Commerce, Ternium failed
to provide Commerce with the requested information, thereby
preventing Commerce from having all of the data it needed in order
to calculate Mueller's antidumping margin.347  Consequently,
Commerce calculated Mueller's antidumping margin using "facts
otherwise available" under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e.148 The Federal Circuit
stated that
[s]pecifically, Commerce concluded that he production costs of
the goods Mueller acquired from Ternium (data that was
unavailable) were related to acquisition costs (data that was
available). Commerce identified the three sales transactions
between TUNA and Mueller made at the greatest discount to
Mueller-where Mueller's acquisition cost was the furthest below
TUNA's production cost. Commerce then inferred that all of
Ternium's pipe that was sold to Mueller involved this discount for
acquisition cost. This enabled Commerce to calculate Ternium's
cost of production from Mueller's cost of acquisition from
Ternium. Although there were other sales transactions between
TUNA and Mueller that were not discounted as significantly,
Commerce chose not to use that data. In its Final Results,
Commerce used data from the three transactions to calculate a new
weighted-average dumping rate for Mueller of 19.81 [%]."4
Mueller then filed an action in the Trade Court to appeal the
antidumping margin imposed by Commerce. In its Trade Court
appeal, Mueller argued that "Commerce's application of Ternium's
AFA to its calculation of the margin for Mueller, despite Mueller's
full cooperation with Commerce's requests, was improper" and that
"Commerce should have calculated production costs using the entire
TUNA data set" or at least used some of information from
345. Id. at 1229-30.
346. Id. at 1230.
347. Id.
348. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 167 7e(a) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
349. Id.
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Ternium 5 ' Finding Commerce's application of other facts available
to calculate Mueller's antidumping margin to be reasonable, the
Trade Court affirmed, and Mueller appealed.35'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the decision of the Trade
Court and remanded the case so that Commerce could re-calculate
"an accurate [antidumping margin] rate for Mueller.3 52 In reaching
this conclusion, the Federal Circuit considered two different methods
that Commerce might use to supply missing information: the "facts
otherwise available" approach3 5' and the "adverse facts available"
approach. 3 54 The Federal Circuit explained that the "facts otherwise
available" approach "may be used whether or not any pafty has failed
to cooperate fully with the agency in its inquiry" 55 but that the
"adverse facts available" approach may only be used "when
'Commerce makes the separate determination that [the party] has
failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability. '356
The Federal Circuit then went on to consider the data used by
Commerce in calculating Mueller's antidumping margin and the two
rationales used by Commerce to support its data selection, noting
that "[i]f one [of the rationales] fails, as we conclude it does,
Commerce's ruling cannot stand."3 57 Specifically, the Federal Circuit
rejected Commerce's argument that using an adverse inference to
assess Ternium's production costs resulted in "the most accurate
calculation of Mueller's antidumping rate" because "Commerce's
accuracy rationale for its calculation of Mueller's antidumping rate
was unsupported by substantial evidence.'"358 However, because the
350. Id. at 1230-31 & n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
351. Id. at 1231.
352. Id. at 1235.
353. Id. at 1231 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)). Under § 1677e(a), if a party
impedes an AD/CVD investigation or proceeding and/or provides unverifiable
information, withholds information, or fails to produce certain information,
Commerce may "use the facts otherwise available" to it, including facts unfavorable
to that party, "in reaching the applicable determination" in that proceeding.
354. Mueller Comercial de Mex., S. de RL. de C.V., 753 F.3d at 1231-32 (quoting 19
U.S.C. § 1677e(b)). Under § 1677e(b), Commerce, "in reaching the applicable
determination under this subtitle, may use an inference that is adverse to the
interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available" if a party
fails to properly cooperate with Commerce during an AD/CVD proceeding.
355. Mueller Comercial de Mex., S. de R.L. de C. V, 753 F.3d 1232 (citing 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677e(a); Zhejiang DunAn Hetian Metal Co. v. United States, 652 F.3d 1333, 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
356. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)).
357. Id. (citing SECv. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947)).
358. Id. at 1233.
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other rationale passed muster, the Federal Circuit remanded the
matter for Commerce to calculate "an accurate rate for Mueller."359
d. Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Ltd. v. United States
In Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Ltd. v. United States,36 the Federal
Circuit reviewed the application of adverse inferences in connection
with a CVD-related investigation.361 In this case, Commerce initiated
a CVD investigation with respect to the production of multilayered
wood flooring in China.362 In connection with this CVD investigation,
Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Ltd. ("Fine Furniture") was designated a
"mandatory respondent" by Commerce, and Commerce designated
the People's Republic of China as the foreign government
respondent in this investigation."6 Although Fine Furniture fully
cooperated in the investigation, China failed to provide certain
information requested by Commerce."6 Consequently, Commerce
relied on adverse inferences to determine that the Chinese
government's provision of electricity qualified as a specific financial
contribution and to select the benchmark for determining the
existence and amount of benefit a company would receive as the
result of this contribution.65
The Trade Court ruled that Commerce was correct in turning to
adverse inferences to fill in the gaps for missing information the
Chinese government controlled and failed to provide.366  Fine
Furniture appealed and, in so doing, "alleg[ed] that Commerce
improperly used adverse inferences against Fine Furniture, a
cooperating party, in calculating the CVD rate."'367 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Trade Court,
concluding that Commerce acted appropriately by applying adverse
inferences to assess the CVD rate.368
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit recognized that
Commerce routinely requests information from foreign governments
359. See id. at 1233, 1235 (finding a sufficient policy consideration when Mueller
failed to induce Ternium's cooperation and thereby allowed Ternium to continually
evade its antidumping requirements).
360. 748 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
361. Id. at 1367.
362. Id.
363. Id.




368. Id. at 1368.
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that it suspects offer subsidies in order to calculate the amount of
CVD to be imposed on the import of merchandise.69 However, when
Commerce lacks the information necessary to calculate the rate of
the CVD, Commerce may use "facts otherwise available" and may also
"apply an adverse inference in selecting from among the facts otherwise
available when an interested party fails to cooperate by not acting to
the best of its ability to comply with a request for information."7 '
The Federal Circuit held that, in connection with calculating the
CVD rate applicable to Fine Furniture, Commerce properly applied
an adverse inference in selecting from the facts otherwise available
to it. 7' In support of this decision, the Federal Circuit stated, in
relevant part, that
[b] ecause the government of China refused to provide information
as to how the electricity process and costs varied among the various
provinces that supplied electricity to industries within their areas,
Commerce relied on an adverse inference to determine that Fine
Furniture received a countervailable subsidy. Commerce also
noted that the government of China did not provide the data
sufficient to establish the benchmark price for electricity, leading
Commerce to apply an adverse inference by choosing the highest
applicable electricity rates for the user categories reported by the
mandatory respondents to calculate the benchmark. This selection
is made under the assumption that this price is the least likely to be
subsidized and is consistent with what Commerce has done in other
administrative determinations in which the government of China
refused to respond to portions of Commerce's questionnaires.37
Finally, as the Federal Circuit noted, "[a] lthough it is unfortunate
that cooperating respondents may be subject to collateral effects due
to the adverse inferences applied when a government fails to respond
to Commerce's questions, this result is not contrary to the statute or
its purposes, nor is it inconsistent with this court's precedent."7 3
3. Other notable AD/CVD decisions
a. Wind Tower Trade Coalition v. United States
In Wind Tower Trade Coalition v. United States,374 the Federal Circuit
reviewed a decision of the Trade Court denying motions for
369. Id. at 1369-70.
370. Id. at 1370 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)-(b) (2012)).
371. Id. at 1372.
372. Id. (citations omitted).
373. Id. at 1373.
374. 741 F.3d 89 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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injunctive relief brought by Wind Tower Trade Coalition ("Wind
Tower") to prevent the liquidation, and, therefore, the entry into the
United States, of utility wind towers.375 The Trade Court initially
issued temporary restraining orders preventing the liquidation and
entry of the wind towers while the parties presented arguments as to
whether the court should issue a permanent injunction.376
However, after reviewing the submissions, the Trade Court denied
the request for injunctions, finding that Wind Tower had not
demonstrated that it would likely prevail on the merits, and Wind
Tower appealed.77 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
decision of the Trade Court, holding that Wind Tower would likely
not prevail on the merits because the USITC voting pattern did not
conclusively show that the industry would be harmed, a condition
precedent to a finding that an AD or CVD order should be issued."78
b. Fedmet Resources Corp. v. United States
In Fedmet Resources Corp. v. United States,79 the Federal Circuit heard
an appeal brought by the importer ("Fedmet"), regarding the scope
of an existing AD and CVD order pertaining to certain magnesia
carbon bricks ("MCBs") imported from Mexico and China (the
"Order").380 In this case, Fedmet asked Commerce to clarify the
scope of the Order. Specifically, it requested that Commerce
determine that "[Fedmet's] Bastion@ line of magnesia carbon
alumina ('MAC') bricks was outside the scope of the outstanding
[Order] .... ,38l In its scope request, Fedmet argued that its MAC
bricks should not be subject to the Order because the MAC bricks
contain different levels and amounts of magnesia, alumina, carbon,
and other elements that are typically present in MCB, which in turn,
cause MAC bricks to perform differently from MCBs.382
375. Id. at 92-94.
376. Id. at 94.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 97-101 (reasoning that Commerce's interpretation of the AD/CVD
statutes was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because Congress did not directly speak to the voting
pattern at issue and the agency's interpretation was reasonable).
379. 755 F.3d 912 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
380. Id. at 913-14. MCBs are refractory bricks (fire bricks) lining ladles and
furnaces in the steelmaking and steel handling processes to withstand high heat and
to promote energy efficiency. Id. at 914.
381. Id. at 916 (footnote omitted).
382. Id. at 916-17.
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After conducting an investigation and reviewing information and
materials provided by interested parties, Commerce initially ruled
that Fedmet's MAC bricks did, indeed, fall within the ambit of the
Order."' In making this preliminary determination, "Commerce first
found that the plain language of [the Order] was ambiguous
regarding whether 'MCBs with alumina' were covered," and in order
to resolve the ambiguity, "turned to the extrinsic information
obtained from interested parties and [to] its own research during the
scope proceedings.""4 In so doing, "Commerce gave 'the greatest
weight' to the fact that Fedmet's MAC bricks 'fall squarely' within the
levels of magnesia and carbon provided in the orders."3"5 Given that
"Commerce also found that Fedmet's MAC bricks have the same
characteristics and uses as MCBs, and are marketed and sold in the
same way and through similar channels as MCBs," Commerce
ultimately concluded that Fedmet's MAC bricks were within the
scope of the Order.
86
Subsequently, Fedmet brought an action in the Trade Court to
challenge the scope ruling issued by Commerce, and the Trade Court
affirmed.8 7 The Trade Court agreed with Commerce that the record
evidence revealed that the Order was ambiguous as to whether it
covered "MCBs with alumina," and relied upon other evidence, also
obtained by Commerce during its investigation and appearing in the
record, to support the conclusion that the Order covered MAC
bricks. 8 Fedmet appealed, arguing that, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Trade Court and Commerce, the Order was clear and
unambiguous as to which type of refractive bricks clearly fell within its
scope (e.g., MCBs) and which were outside of its reach (i.e., MACs) 389
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that both the Trade Court
and Commerce erred in concluding that the Order was ambiguous
and, therefore, applied to both MACs and MCBs. 90 In reversing, the
Federal Circuit held that the plain language of the Order, which
adopted nearly verbatim the proposed scope language of the AD
and CVD investigations underlying the Order, applied only to MCBs





388. Id. at 917-18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
389. Id. at 918-19.
390. Id. at 922-23 (reasoning that Commerce's decision was not supported by
substantial evidence).
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and clearly excluded Fedmet's MAC bricks. 91 In its analysis, the
Federal Circuit noted that, "[t] he plain language of a countervailing
or antidumping order is 'paramount' in determining whether
particular products are included within its scope.'3 92 In order to
determine whether a particular product is covered by the plain
language of an AD or CVD order (i.e., within the scope of the
order), "Commerce must consider '[t]he descriptions of the
merchandise contained in the petition, the initial investigation, and
the determinations of the Secretary (including prior scope
determinations) and the [USITC].""' If these sources, referred to
as (k) (1) sources, are not dispositive, Commerce may proceed to an
evaluation of other information, including information appearing
in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k) (2). 94
After evaluating information from the (k) (1) sources supporting
the Order, the Federal Circuit concluded that " It] he (k) (1) sources
are dispositive and unequivocally confirm that Fedmet's MAC bricks
are not within the scope of the orders.",95 The Federal Circuit noted
that the (k) (1) sources contained multiple indications from one of
the interested parties that MAC bricks have different physical
properties and perform differently than MCBs, that MCBs and MAC
bricks are priced differently, and that "MCBs and MAC bricks are 'not
generally substitutable"' for each other.96 Further, the Federal
Circuit noted that "the (k) (1) sources confirm Commerce and the
[USITC's] understanding that the underlying investigations did not
extend to MAC bricks."397 Although it concluded that "the question
before this Court was asked and answered during the underlying
investigations," the Federal Circuit went on to re-emphasize that "the
(k) (1) sources are afforded primacy in the scope analysis... because
391. Id. at 919-20.
392. Id. at 918 (quoting King Supply Co. v. United States, 674 F.3d 1343, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2012)).
393. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) (2014)). The court
denotes the sources of information listed in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) as "the
(k)(1) sources." Id.
394. Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. §351.225(k)(2)). The court denotes the criteria
described in § 351.225(k) (2) as the "(k) (2) criteria." Id. These criteria include the
characteristics of a product, how said product is to be used, marketed and/or sold,
the expectations of those who will use the product, and so on. 19 C.F.R.
§ 352.225(k) (2) (i)-(v).
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interpretation of the language used in the orders must be based on the
meaning iven to that language during the underlying investigations.""'8
c. Michaels Stores, Inc. v. United States
Michaels Stores, Inc. v. United States" involved an appeal by Michaels
Stores, Inc. ("Michaels") challenging the customs duty rates imposed
by Commerce upon certain pencils imported by Michaels from the
People's Republic of China.4"' Commerce imposed AD orders levying
a 114.90% country-wide ad valorem duty on the pencils, but allowed
certain Chinese producers to import the subject pencils under a
lower producer rate pending administrative review of the producers
to show that they were not subject to state control.4"1 For certain
producers, the rates were 26.32% and 10.41% (for producer China
First), 2.66% (for producer Three Star), and 11.48% and 3.55% (for
producer Rongxin).402
When Michaels imported the pencils from these producers, it
made cash deposits with CBP to cover anticipated AD-related customs
duties in amounts reflecting the producer rates but not at the
114.90% ad valorem rate.4"3  Subsequently, CBP issued bills to
Michaels for the difference, and Michaels protested.4 In its protest,
Michaels challenged the additional amounts due claimed by CBP,
asserting that it should only have to pay the producer rates and not
the full ad valorem rate.405 However, CBP rejected Michaels's protest.4"6
Michaels then brought an action in the Trade Court, again arguing
that it should only have to pay the producer rates and not the full ad
valorem rate.407 The Trade Court affirmed the determination of the
CBP, and Michaels appealed to the Federal Circuit.40 8 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Trade Court, holding
398. Id. at 920-21 (emphasis added).
399. 766 F.3d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
400. Id. at 1389.
401. Id. at 1390-91.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1391.
404. Id.
405. Id. Michaels based its argument on 19 C.F.R. §351.107(b)(2), which
provides that "if the Secretary has not established previously a combination cash
deposit rate ... for the exporter and producer in question or a noncombination rate
for the exporter in question, the Secretary will apply the cash deposit rate established
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that the producer rates issued under Commerce's regulations
constituted a permissible interpretation of the AD statute provisions."9
IV. FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVIEW OF SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS AND
RELATED MATTERS BEFORE THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
A. Judicial Review of Section 337 Investigations
Unlike the Commission's AD- and CVD-related proceedings, which
are first reviewed by the Trade Court and then appealed to the
Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction for
appeals of the interlocutory and final determinations of the
Commission with respect to section 337 investigations and related
proceedings.' In 2014, the Federal Circuit only published four
opinions with respect to the section 337 investigations conducted by
the Commission.41' In two of these cases, the Federal Circuit
reversed, in part or in whole, and remanded to the Commission for
further proceedings.41 2  In the remaining two cases, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the decision below in one413 and denied the relief
sought in the other.414
Of the four section 337 opinions published by the Federal Circuit
in 2014, two cases involved the construction and scope of consent
orders between U.S. companies and foreign importers where the
foreign importers imported or attempted to import merchandise that
infringed upon each of the U.S. companies' respective patents.415
The other tWo cases involved section 337 investigations wherein the
409. Id. at 1389, 1393. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(3) (1994) (requiring
estimated AD duties to be deposited at the same time as estimated normal customs
duties are deposited).
410. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) (2012) (appeals of interlocutory decisions); id.
§ 1295(a) (6) (final determinations).
411. Section 337 addresses unfair practices in import trade. 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(2004). Under § 1337(c), any person adversely affected by the Commission's final
determination regarding unfair import practices may appeal to the Federal Circuit. Id.
412. UPI Semiconductor Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 767 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Align Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 771 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
413. X2YAttenuators, LLCv. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 757 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
414. See In re Nokia Inc., 760 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (denying a
petition for a writ of mandamus).
415. See UPI Semiconductor Corp., 767 F.3d at 1375 (quoting the contents of the
consent order at issue and explaining that the Administrative LawJudge entered it
mostly as drafted by the respondent, a technology company); Align Tech., Inc., 771
F.3d at 1318-19 (concerning allegations that a developer of aligners to treat teeth
misalignment imported products that infringed a competitor company's
intellectual property).
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Commission concluded that no infringing use had occurred.416 One
of those case s involved a relatively straightforward construction of the
complainant's patents, which resulted in a clear disavowal of claim
scope, thereby precluding a finding of a violation of section 337.417
The other case came to the Federal Circuit by way of a petition for
writ of mandamus, wherein the complaining U.S. company sought to
compel the Commission to re-evaluate the petitioner's non-
infringement contention.48
B. USITC Section 337 Investigations Reviewed by the Federal Circuit in 2014
1. UPI Semiconductor Corp. v. U.S. International Trade Commission
In UPI Semiconductor v. U.S. International Trade Commission,419 the
Federal Circuit reviewed a decision by the USITC that uPI
Semiconductor Corp. ("uPI"), the respondent-intervenor in a section
337 patent infringement case, violated various provisions of a
Consent Order between uPI and Richtek Technology Corp. and
Richtek USA, Inc. (collectively, "Richtek")."42 In 2010, Richtek filed a
section 337 complaint with the USITC, alleging that uPI infringed
upon several of Richtek's U.S. patents and other trade secrets with
respect to certain direct current to direct current (DC-DC) voltage
controllers and that the import and sale by uPI of said controllers
violated section 337.421
Prior to an evidentiary hearing regarding Richtek's complaint and
in an effort to terminate the USITC investigation, uPI moved for the
entry of a consent order (drafted by uPI), wherein uPI would agree
not to import into the United States any products that contained any
components that infringed upon Richtek's patents (the "Consent
416. See In re Nokia, Inc., 760 F.3d at 1348 (deciding, without reaching the merits,
that because the petitioners had waived an infringement claim before the
Commission); X2Y Altenuators, LLC, 757 F.3d at 1363 (finding no section 337
violation where the petitioner, X2Y Attenuators, LLC, conceded that Intel had not
infringed any of its patents).
417. See X2YAttenuators, LLC, 757 F.3d at 1362-63 (determining that he standard
for finding disavowal had been met by labeling an element "essential" and by stating
a particular feature was "universal").
418. See In re Nokia, Inc., 760 F.3d at 1348 (rejecting the petitioners' request to
have the court issue a writ of mandamus because the petitioners had not raised an
infringement claim below).
419. 767 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
420. Id. at 1374-75.
421. Id.
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Order")422 Although Richtek objected, the USITC administrative law
judge ("ALJ") to whom the case was assigned entered the uPI-drafted
Consent Order.423 About a year later, however, Richtek brought a suit
to enforce the Consent Order. In that case, Richtek alleged that uPI
violated the Order in two respects: first, with respect to the
infringing products that were the subject of Richtek's initial USITC
complaint (the "formerly accused products"), and second, with
respect to "[certain] products allegedly developed and produced after
entry of the Consent Order (the 'post-Consent Order products') ."424
In the USITC enforcement proceeding, the ALJ determined that
the formerly accused products violated Richtek's patents and used its
trade secrets, but that the post-Consent Order products, which the
ALJ considered to be violative of Richtek's patents, did not use any of
Richtek's trade secrets.4 25  In so holding, the ALJ fined uPI
approximately $750,000.426 Subsequently, both parties petitioned for
full Commission review.42 7 Upon full Commission review, the USITC
held that the formerly accused products-but not the post-Consent
Order products-were developed using Richtek's trade secrets.4 '
The USITC also affirmed the ALJ's ruling that the formerly accused
products only violated one of Richtek's patents, but held that none of
the other formerly accused products or any of the post-Consent
Order products violated Richtek's patents.4 29  The full USITC also
vacated as moot certain other infringement claims raised by
Richtek.430 Because the USITC affirmed some but not all of the ALJ's
holdings, it reduced uPI's fine to $620,000, and Richtek appealed to
the Federal Circuit.
431
On appeal, uPI argued that the Consent Order's aiding and
abetting provisions432 could not reach imports of infringing products
422. Id. at 1375.
423. Id.
424. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
425. Id. at 1375-76.




430. Id. at 1376-77.
431. Id. at 1377.
432. The Consent Order states, in relevant part, that "uPI will not... knowingly
aid, abet, encourage, participate in, or induce importation into the United States...
or the sale, offer for sale, or use in the United States after importation, without the
consent or agreement of Richtek, any DC-DC controllers or products containing the
same which infringe [Richtek's patents]." Id. at 1375.
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by third parties because the USITC failed to enter a general exclusion
order pursuant to Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade
Commissionl" and because the USITC could not show which of uPI's
products directly infringed upon any of Richtek's patents or which
of uPI's DC-DC controllers sold after the entry of the Consent
Order (i.e., were post-Consent Order products) contained any
formerly accused products.434 The Federal Circuit rejected uPI's
arguments here, holding that "[s]ubstantial evidence supports the
Commission's findings that uPI post-Consent Order upstream sales
were linked to subsequent downstream United States imports or
sales of the formerly accused products and that uPI knowingly aided
or abetted United States imports or sales of the formerly accused
products.""' The Federal Circuit also rejected uPI's Kyocera
argument, holding that "[t]he Consent Order prohibits uPI from
knowingly aiding or abetting the importation of DC-DC controllers
produced using or containing Richtek trade secrets or infringing
Richtek patents, or products containing the same."436 Additionally,
the Federal Circuit rejected a similar argument raised by uPI with
respect to one of Richtek's patents.437
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the Commission's conclusion
that none of the post-Consent Order products were made using
Richtek's trade secrets.438 To the contrary, the Federal Circuit ruled
that substantial evidence tended to show that the post-Consent Order
products were not independently developed, as claimed by uPI, but
433. 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Kyocera, the Federal Circuit overturned a
limited exclusion order (LEO) issued by the USITC under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2)
against certain infringing products imported by Qualcomm Inc., which was not a
respondent o the underlying section 337 investigation. In overturning the LEO, the
Federal Circuit held that 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2), which permitted general exclusion
orders to be issued to all persons, including section 337 investigation non-
respondents, to prevent the entry of infringing products into the United States, only
permitted LEOs to be issued against the infringing products of respondents to the
underlying section 337 investigation. Id. at 1358.
434. UPI Semiconductor, 767 F.3d at 1378 (defining general exclusion orders,
which, in contrast to limited exclusion orders that only apply to the parties before
the Commission, bar anyone from importing the infringing products).
435. Id.
436. Id. at 1380 (internal quotation marks omitted).
437. Id. (affirming the Commission's finding that uPI knowingly aided or abetted
the sale of formerly accused products in violation of the Consent Order with respect
to U.S. Patent No. 7,315,190 (issued Jan. 1, 2008)).
438. Id. at 1381-82 (noting that uPI did not produce any evidence to rebut
Richtek's argument that certain markings and other data found in materials used by
uPI indicated violations of Richtek's patent).
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were produced or developed using Richtek's trade secrets in violation
of the Consent Order.439  Consequently, the Federal Circuit
remanded the case to the full Commission.440
2. In re Nokia Inc.
In re Nokia, Inc.441 involved a section 337 case initially reviewed by
the Federal Circuit in 2012.442 In the 2012 case, the Federal Circuit
ruled that the Commission erred in finding that Nokia did not
infringe upon certain wireless telephone patents,443 held that the
Commission misconstrued certain claim terms in those patents,444
and remanded the case for additional proceedings consistent with
that opinion. In the case below, the Federal Circuit stated:
Nokia proposes two alternative grounds to support the
Commission's decision. First, Nokia argues that that there can be
no infringement in this case because the scrambling codes in the
Nokia system are not transmitted. Neither the administrative law
judge nor the Commission addressed that argument. The agency's
decision was not predicated on that rationale, and under well-
settled principles of administrative law, we are not free to accept
Nokia's invitation to uphold the agency's decision on a ground not
ruled on by the agency. That issue, if Nokia wishes to raise it again
before the Commission, may be raised on remand."6
Upon remand, the Federal Circuit noted that "the Commission
determined that petitioners had waived any argument that the
scrambling codes in their accused systems are not transmitted as
required by the patent claims in the underlying investigation.
447
Subsequently, Nokia filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the
439. Id. at 1383.
440. Id.
441. 760 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
442. InterDigital Commc'ns, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 690 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. denied, Nokia, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 469 (2013).
443. Id. at 1320 (citing U.S. Patent Nos. 7,190,966 and 7,286,847). Both of these
patents, held by affiliated U.S. companies, dealt with the allocation of radio
frequency spectrum used in a Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") cellular
communications system. Id. at 1320-21.
444. In this case, the Federal Circuit was asked to decide whether a USITC ALJ
used the correct definition of the claim terms "code" and "increased power level,"
since those terms are used in the patents, when the ALJ undertook to construct the
claims set forth in the patents. Id. at 1323-24.
445. Id. at 1320 (citing U.S. Patent No. 7,190,966 (granted Mar. 13, 2007); U.S.
Patent No. 7,286,847 (granted Oct. 23, 2007)).
446. Id. at 1328-29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
447. In reNokia, Inc., 760 F.3d at 1348.
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Federal Circuit, requesting that the Federal Circuit "compel the
Commission to address [Nokia's] non-infringement argument. "441
The Federal Circuit denied Nokia's petition.49  Citing the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Will v. United States,450 where the Court
declared that the writ of mandamus is an "extraordinary remedy" that
should only be used to require a lower court to exercise its
jurisdiction when it has a "duty to do so,"451 the Federal Circuit stated
that "[a]lthough mandamus is an available remedy to enforce
compliance with a prior mandate, nothing in our prior decision
compelled the Commission to address the petitioners' non-
infringement contention."452  The Federal Circuit held that the
language it used concerning remand merely served to identify an
issue that Nokia might choose to raise on remand, but that its
language certainly "did not suggest, and did not mandate, that the





3. Align Technology, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission
In Alig-n Technology, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission,4151 the
Federal Circuit reviewed and overturned a determination by the full
Commission that a party to a consent order did not violate the terms
of the consent order when it electronically transmitted digital data
concerning the subject of the consent order into the United States.
4 55
In 2006, Align Technologies, Inc. ("Align") initiated a section 337
patent infringement complaint against OrthoClear, Inc., OrthoClear
Holdings, Inc., and OrthoClear Pakistan Pvt, Ltd. (collectively,
"OrthoClear") alleging infringement of its patents related to the
Invisalign System, a product line of dental aligners.4 56 Because each
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
451. Id. at 95 (internal quotation marks omitted). In vacating the writ of
mandamus, the Will Court noted that the purpose of mandamus "is not to 'control
the decision of the trial court,' but rather merely to confine the lower court to the
sphere of its discretionary power." Id. at 104 (emphasis added) (quoting Bankers Life
& Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382-83 (1953)).
452. Id. (citation omitted).
453. In re Nokia, Inc., 760 F.3d at 1348.
454. 771 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
455. Id. at 1322, 1326.
456. Id. at 1319 & n.1 (listing Align's patents that were at issue). An alternative to
traditional braces, the Invisalign System uses clear dental aligners to adjust the
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patient is unique, the Invisalign dental aligners are custom-made,
which requires the creation, transmission, and use of digital three-
dimensional models for each incremental adjustment stage and
related "digital data sets.
457
Subsequently, in August 2006, OrthoClear settled with Align and
agreed to transfer certain intellectual property to Align and to enter
into a consent order ("Consent Order").458 Specifically, the Consent
Order required that "[t] he incremental dental positioning
adjustment appliances manufactured by or for OrthoClear
referenced in the complaint and any other articles manufactured in
violation of the patents or trade secrets described therein.., are
hereby prohibited from importation into the United States until the
[occurrence of certain stated events].""'  As the Federal Circuit
noted, "[t]he Consent Order also included successor and aiding-and-
abetting provisions that extended the importation prohibition
beyond OrthoClear."46
Suspecting violations of the Consent Order by OrthoClear and
related parties, Align filed an enforcement complaint with the
USITC; the USITC began investigating several new respondents.46'
At issue in the investigation was whether the additional respondents
("the Intervenors") violated the Consent Order by electronically
importing into the United States digital data sets used by
ClearCorrect where the digital data sets involved the use of Align's
trade secrets or "induced or contributed to the infringement of
certain claims of Align's patents.4 62  The court also addressed
whether ClearCorrect's and others' use of the digital data sets
violated the "aiding and abetting" provisions of the Consent Order.463
In initiating the investigation, as the Federal Circuit noted, the
Commission's Notice of Institution "recommended that the ALJ 'may
wish to consider' a threshold issue: 'whether the accused digital
alignment of a dental patient's teeth. Id. at 1319. The adjustment is done on an
incremental basis over a fixed period. Id.
457. Id. at 1319.
458. Id.
459. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
460. Id.
461. Id. at 1320. Here, the additional respondents (the "Intervenors"), which
included various incarnations of an entity known as ClearCorrect, were alleged to be
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datasets identified in the enforcement complaint.., are within the
scope of the articles covered by the consent order."4'4
Although the Notice of Institution stated that the ALJ should issue
its decision "in the form of an initial determination ('ID') under
Commission Rule 210.42(c), 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(c)," the ALJ instead
chose to issue an order.465 In Order No. 57, the ALJ found that the
data sets fell "within the scope of the term 'articles manufactured"' as
set forth in the Consent Order, and that transmission of the data sets
within the United States, therefore, violated the Consent Order.466
Consequently, the ALJ denied a motion to terminate the
investigation filed by the Intervenors and set the matter for trial.467
Upon review, the full Commission reversed Order No. 57 and
terminated enforcement proceedings with respect to the Consent
Order, holding that the Consent Order failed to specifically prohibit
electronic transmission of the digital data sets.4"a In reaching this
conclusion, the Commission reasoned that, "the accused digital data
sets were not covered by the scope of the Consent Order because the
subject consent order did not contain an express provision
prohibiting the electronic transmission of data."469
On appeal, the Federal Circuit overturned the Commission's
reversal of Order No. 57.47' As the Federal Circuit noted, the review
of the Commission's determinations is governed by the APA,
meaning that the Federal Circuit "must set aside any findings or
conclusions of the Commission that are 'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' 471 In
the instant case, the Federal Circuit found that the Commission's
review of Order No. 57 violated the Commission's own procedural
464. Id. at 1320-21 (quoting Certain Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment
Appliances and Methods of Producing Same; Notice of Institution of Formal
Enforcement Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,747 (May 1, 2012)).
465. Id. at 1321 (quoting Certain Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment
Appliances and Methods of Producing Same; Notice of Institution of Formal
Enforcement Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,747); see 19 C.F.R. § 210.42 (2014)
(concerning "[i]nitial determinations"). Note also that part 210 of Title 19 of the
Code of Federal Regulations "appl[ies] to investigations under section 337 of the
TariffAct... and related proceedings." 19 C.F.R. § 210.1.
466. Align Tech., Inc., 771 F.3d at 1321.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
470. Id. at 1326.
471. Id. at 1322 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2012)).
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rules, including Rule 210.42(c),472 because an ALJ is required to deny
certain motions-including a motion to terminate an investigation-
by issuing an order, and because the Commission may not review on
appeal an order issued by an ALJ unless the ALJ has first issued an
initial determination."' Because the Commission may not
circumvent its own rules "without waiving, suspending, or amending
them," the Federal Circuit found that the Commission's "review of
Order No. 57 was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."
474
Finally, noting that the Commission could, on remand, properly
waive application of Rule 210.42(c) and "propel[] this case back to us
without the errant procedural flaw but substantially unchanged," the
Federal Circuit noted that "[the interests of judicial efficiency"
required it to warn the Commission that it found the reasoning
behind the Commission's purported requirement that a remedial
order specifically mention electronic data for the order to cover said
data to be unpersuasive.475 Indeed, the Federal Circuit found that
neither of the two cases identified by the Commission were sufficient
to support the conclusion that it had "an established practice sufficient
tO put the public on notice" about the Commission's requirement that
remedial orders must specifically identify electronic data for said
electronic data to be covered under any such remedial order.
476
4. X2YAttenuators, LLC v. International Trade Commission
In X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. International Trade Commission,477 the
patentee, X2Y Attenuators, LLC ("X2Y"), filed a patent infringement
complaint with USITC against Intel Corporation and related parties
("Intel") under section 337.478 X2Y alleged that Intel unlawfully
imported certain microprocessor products that contained components
(specifically, certain electrodes) that allegedly infringed upon three
472. Rule 210.42(c) (1) states that an ALJ, in a section 337 proceeding, "shall grant
[certain] types of motions by issuing an initial determination or shall deny them by
issuing an order," and rule 210.42(c) (2) provides that "[an ALJ] shall grant or deny
[certain other] types of motions by issuing an initial determination [only] . 19
C.F.R. § 210.42(c) (2014).
473. Align Tech., Inc., 771 F.3d at 1322 (citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.24, 210.42(c) (1)).
474. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
475. Id. at 1326.
476. Id.
477. 757 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
478. Id. at 1359.
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of X2Y's patents.47 9 Although the parties referred to several of the
claim terms appearing in the patents "collectively as 'electrode terms'
or 'center ground plane terms"' during the USITC proceedings, as
the Federal Circuit noted, "[t] he parties disputed whether the electrode
terms were limited to the so-called 'sandwich' configuration-an
arrangement of three electrodes in which a center conductor is
flanked by paired differential, or oppositely charged, conductors.""4 '
At the USITC proceedings, Intel argued that the claim terms
related to the electrodes "should be limited to the sandwich
configuration, [but] X2Y contended that the electrode terms
require[d] no construction and should be given their plain and
ordinary meanings."481 Ultimately, the USITC adopted the
construction of the electrode terms adopted by the ALJ, which
construed "the electrode terms as requiring a common conductive
pathway electrode positioned between paired electromagnetically
opposite conductors."'482 As the Federal Circuit noted,
[tihis construction was based on specification disavowal-for
example, the statement in the '500 patent that the sandwich
configuration is "an essential element among all embodiments or
connotations of the invention," and a statement incorporated by
reference into the '444 patent that this configuration is a "feature[]
universal to all the embodiments." Because X2Y conceded
noninfringement on the basis of this construction, the USITC
found no violation.
48 3
On appeal, X2Y contended that the Commission committed three
errors in finding non-infringement.4 84 First, X2Y argued that the
USITC erred in construing the electrode terms, in that the USITC
read into the electrode terms certain "functional and structural
limitations into the meaning of the term 'electrode.'4 5 Second, X2Y
argued that USITC's construction of the various electrode terms were
contradicted by the specifications of the asserted patents.4 6 Finally,
479. Id. at 1359-60 (citing U.S. Patent No. 8,023,241 (granted Sept. 20, 2011);
U.S. Patent No. 7,916,444 (granted Mar. 29, 2011); U.S. Patent No. 7,609,500
(granted Oct. 27, 2009)).
480. Id. at 1360 (internal quotation marks omitted).
481. Id. at 1361.
482. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
483. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
484. Id. at 1361-62.
485. Id. at 1361.
486. Id.
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noted the Federal Circuit, "X2Y argue [d] that the statements relied
upon by the USITC [did] not constitute disavowal of claim scope."
487
However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission's ruling of
non-infringement, concluding that the USITC "correctly construed
the electrode terms."488  In reaching this conclusion, the Federal
Circuit found that statements in the patents clearly demonstrated
disavowal of claim scope.48 ' For example, the Federal Circuit held that
[t]he patents' statements that the presence of a common
conductive pathway electrode positioned between paired
electromagnetically opposite conductors is "universal to all the
embodiments" and is "an essential element among all
embodiments or connotations of the invention" constitute clear
and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope. The standard for
finding disavowal, while exacting, was met in this case.490
Indeed, as the Federal Circuit has specifically held that "labeling an
embodiment or an element as essential may rise to the level of
disavowal," and went on to note that, in this case, "not only does the
specification state that the 'center common conductive pathway
electrode' flanked by two differential conductors is 'essential,' but it
also spells out that it was an 'essential element among all
embodiments or connotations of the invention. "'49 Consequently, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the USITC's determination that Intel did
not infringe upon any of X2Y's patents, and, therefore, that Intel
had not violated section 337.492
CONCLUSION
In 2014, the Federal Circuit addressed a wide variety of
international trade matters ranging from customs duties and tariff
assessments, to anti-dumping and countervailing duties, to section
337 cases. Generally speaking, the opinions delivered by the Federal
Circuit involved basic principles of statutory construction, and, in
most cases, the court interpreted the relevant statutes and regulations
in a manner consistent with familiar principles of judicial precedent
and administrative procedure.
That said, however, the Federal Circuit's 2014 term was also
striking, in a few respects, as the court also had the rare opportunity
487. Id. at 1361-62.
488. Id. at 1362.
489. Id.
490. Id. (citation omitted).
491. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,609,500 (granted Oct. 27, 2009)).
492. Id. at 1363.
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to discuss important and complex principles of law in the context of
international trade law and litigation. In Deckers, for example, the
Federal Circuit had the opportunity to discuss the principles of its
unique stare decisis approach and jurisprudence in connection with
an HTSUS classification analysis. And in Guangdong Wireking, the Federal
Circuit had the opportunity to evaluate whether the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the U.S. Constitution invalidated an amendment to the
Tariff Act regarding the methods used to calculate AD and CVD rates.
The opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in 2014 also served to
underscore another point: the significant role the Federal Circuit
continues to play with respect to the international trade law and
policy of the United States. Indeed, the Federal Circuit's
international trade jurisprudence remains a key component of the
legal foundation upon which all parties involved in international
trade must rely, and the well-reasoned and well-considered opinions
issued by the Federal Circuit in 2014 only serve to strengthen that
foundation and to reinforce its relevance.
2015]
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APPENDIX
Table: 2014 Precedential Decisions of the U.S. Court Of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit
2014 Federal Circuit Precedentia Cases Type Agency Diypovition
Align Technology, Inc. v. Section International Trade Vacated and
International Trade Commission, 1337 Commission remanded
771 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
In re Nokia Inc., 760 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Section International Trade Order denying
Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 1337 Commission petition for writ of
mandamus (Newman,
J., dissenting)
UPI Semiconductor Corp. v. Section International Trade Affirmed in part,
International Trade Commission, 1337 Commission reversed in part, and
767 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014). remanded
X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. Section International Trade Affirmed (ReynaJ.,
International Trade Commission, 1337 Commission concurring)
757 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. AD Department of Affirmed
United States, 772 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Commerce
Cit. 2014).
Home Meridian International, Inc. AD Department of Reversed
v. United States, 772 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Commerce
Cir. 2014).
Lifestyle Enterprise, Inc. v. United AD Department of Affirmed in part,
States, 751 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. Commerce reversed in part, and
2014). remanded
Marvin Furniture (Shanghai) Co. v. AD Department of Affirmed
United States, 744 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Commerce
Cir. 2014).
Michaels Stores, Inc. v. United AD Department of Affirmed
States, 766 F.3d 1388 (Fed. Cir. Commerce
2014).
Mueller Comercial de Mexico, S. de AD Department of Vacated and
R.L. de C.V. v. United States, 753 Commerce remanded
F.3d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Mukand, Ltd. v. United States, 767 AD Department of Affirmed
F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Commerce
Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. AD Department of Vacated and
United States, 766 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Commerce remanded
Cir. 2014).
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2014 Federal Circuit Precedential Cas Type Agenc Disposition
Qingdao Sea-Line Trading Co. v. AD Department of Affirmed
United States, 766 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Commerce
Cir. 2014).
Thai Plastic Bags Indus. Co. v. AD Department of Affirmed
United States, 774 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Commerce
Cir. 2014).
Thai Plastic Bags Industries Co. v. AD Department of Affirmed
United States, 746 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Commerce
Cir. 2014).
Fedmet Resources Corp. v. United AD/CVD Department of Reversed and
States, 755 F.3d 912 (Fed. Cir. Commerce remanded (Wallach,J.,
2014). dissenting)
Guangdong Wireking Housewares & AD/CVD Department of Affirmed (O'Malley,J.,
Hardware Co. v. United States, 745 Commerce concurring)
F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Wind Tower Trade Coalition v. AD/CVD Department of Affirmed
United States, 741 F.3d 89 (Fed. Cir. Commerce
2014).
Essar Steel, Ltd. v. United States, 753 CVD Department of Affirmed
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Commerce
Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Ltd. v. CVD Department of Affirmed
United States, 748 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Commerce
Cir. 2014).
MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States, CVD Department of Reversed and
753 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Commerce remanded (ReynaJ.,
dissenting)
Alcan Food Packaging (Shelbyville) HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
v. United States, 771 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Border Protection
Cir. 2014).
Belimo Automation A.G. v. United HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
States, 774 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. Border Protection
2014).
Chemsol, LLC v. United States, 755 HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Border Protection
Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
F.3d 949 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Border Protection
Dependable Packaging Solutions, HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 1374 Border Protection
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
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GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States, HTSUS U.S. Customs and Vacated and
761 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Border Protection remanded (ReynaJ.,
dissenting)
GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States, HTSUS U.S. Customs and Order denying
773 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Border Protection rehearing (Newman,
Reyna & Wallach, JJ.,
dissenting)
International Custom Products, Inc. HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
v. United States, 748 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Border Protection
Cir. 2014).
Link Snacks, Inc. v. United States, HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
742 F.3d 962 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Border Protection
R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States, 757 HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Border Protection
Riddell, Inc. v. United States, 754 HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed in part and
F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Border Protection reversed in part
Roche Vitamins, Inc. v. United HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
States, 772 F.3d 728 (Fed. Cir. Border Protection
2014).
United States v. C.H. Robinson Co., HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
760 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Border Protection
United States v. Trek Leather, Inc., HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed
767 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Border Protection
petition for cert. docketed sub. nom
Shadadpuri v. United States (U.S.
Feb. 13, 2015) (No. 14-986 ).
Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC v. HTSUS U.S. Customs and Affirmed (ReynaJ.,
United States, 769 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Border Protection dissenting)
Cir. 2014).
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